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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the effects of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan’s politics, 
internal security, and relationship with the United States. It analyzes the 
perspectives of the United States and Pakistan within the realm of national 
interests, legal framework, and ethical aspects, as well as considers short-term 
benefits and long-term consequences. Whatever the tactical efficacy of drone 
strikes may be, they have contributed to anti-American feelings and a growing 
trust deficit between the United States and Pakistan, and adversely affected the 
actual cause of fighting terrorism. 
The thesis concludes that drones have not achieved significant success in 
the war on terror. The attacks have achieved tactical successes at a very heavy 
cost for Pakistan—and possibly to the detriment of the global war on terror. 
Drone operations have supplemented terrorist recruitment and resolve, pumped 
up anti-U.S. feeling in Pakistan and across the globe, and have set up dangerous 
precedents for countries potentially possessing other countries. The study offers 
a number of recommendations that are not new, but if followed can promote 
improvement at every tier.   
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. THE DRONE DILEMMA: INVESTIGATING THE CAUSES OF 
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN ........ 1 
A. SIGNIFICANCE .................................................................................... 1 
B. THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP ............................................... 2 
C. THE CHANGING VIEW FROM PAKISTAN ......................................... 4 
D. THE TROUBLE WITH DRONES.......................................................... 7 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................... 10 
1. U.S.-Pakistan Relations: A History of Alliance and 
Interests .................................................................................. 11 
2. The World after 9/11 .............................................................. 14 
3. Legal Perspectives ................................................................ 16 
4. Strategic Consequences ....................................................... 20 
5. The Moral Aspect ................................................................... 21 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES .............................................................. 23 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW .......................................................................... 24 
II. TARGETED KILLINGS AND DRONE EVOLUTION .................................... 25 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TARGETED KILLINGS ....................... 25 
B. THE DRONE ERA .............................................................................. 28 
C. REASONS FOR DRONE STRIKES INSIDE PAKISTAN ................... 32 
III. THE DRONE STRIKES: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ..................................... 37 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: SELF-DEFENSE .............................. 38 
1. Necessity, Immediacy, and Proportionality ......................... 39 
2. Redefining Imminent Threat ................................................. 42 
3. The Effect of the UN Charter ................................................. 43 
B. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE .................................................................. 45 
1. Preemption and Prevention: The Bush Doctrine ................ 46 
2. U.S. Domestic Law ................................................................. 48 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ............... 51 
1. State Support to Non-state Actors ....................................... 51 
2. Collateral Damage and Targeted Killings: A Dilemma ....... 54 
3. The UN Perspective ............................................................... 57 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 58 
IV. DRONE OPERATIONS: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS ................................. 61 
A. WHY DRONES ARE PREFERRED IN MODERN WARFARE .......... 62 
1. Benefits: Drone Operations in the GWOT............................ 64 
B. COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR PAKISTAN ........................... 67 
1. Pakistan’s Dilemma ............................................................... 67 
2. Root Cause of Extremism ..................................................... 68 
3. Problems for the Elected Government ................................ 70 
4. Spread of Violence from FATA to Main Cities of Pakistan . 71 
5. Social Effects ......................................................................... 72 
 vii 
C. U.S. RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN’S CONCERNS.............................. 73 
1. Drone: Cure not Cause of Extremism .................................. 73 
2. Better Option than Ground Forces ....................................... 74 
D. AN APPRAISAL: REFUTING U.S. CLAIMS ..................................... 75 
E. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND RAMIFICATIONS ....................... 77 
F. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 78 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 83 
A. THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF DRONE STRIKES ................................ 83 
B. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES .......................... 87 
1. Accountability and Transparency: Democratic Norms ...... 87 
2. Selective Application of Drone Strikes ................................ 88 
3. Harboring Terrorists: Major Reason for Drone Strikes ...... 89 
C. PROBLEMS RELATED TO PAKISTAN ............................................ 89 
1. Sovereignty Issue .................................................................. 90 
2. Collateral Damage ................................................................. 90 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................... 91 
1. Considerations for the United States ................................... 91 
2. Considerations for Pakistan ................................................. 92 
3. Considerations for the International Community ............... 93 
E. REFLECTIONS .................................................................................. 94 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 119 
 
 viii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AUMF  Authorization for Use of Military Force 
CCF Continuous Combatant Function  
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency  
COIN  Counterinsurgency operations 
EO  Executive Order 
EU  European Union  
FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
GWOT  global war on terror 
HVT  high-value targets  
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
IDP  internally displaced person 
IHL International Humanitarian Law  
IHRL  International Human Right Law 
ISI  Inter Services Intelligence 
LEAs  Law Enforcement Agencies  
LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PPG Presidential Policy Guidelines  
TTP  Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan  
U.S. United States 
USAF  United States Air Force  
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to thank the Department of National Security Affairs for providing 
me an opportunity to express myself candidly on this sensitive and important 
subject. I had many informal discussions with professors and military officials 
back home, which proved beneficial. Moreover, guidance and encouragement 
provided to me by Professor Anna Clunan needs a special mention. 
Professor Feroz Khan, who happens to be my second reader, is indeed 
demanding, but quite helpful in providing valuable information on every aspect of 
the thesis. His guidance was helpful indeed. 
The process of my thesis research took considerable time and energy 
from my thesis advisor, Professor Carolyn Halladay. She contributed at every 
stage of my thesis process: from the proposal to the topic selection, and bringing 
it to its final shape. I greatly appreciate her enormous contributions in shaping 
and sharpening each stage of this work.    
 xi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xii 
I. THE DRONE DILEMMA: INVESTIGATING THE CAUSES OF 
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
PAKISTAN 
This thesis analyzes the stance of both the United States and Pakistan on 
drone strikes through the lenses of mutual interests, legality, and strategic 
consequences. Although the United States and Pakistan are close allies with a 
common goal in the global war on terror (GWOT), the two nations diverge on the 
strategic reasons and protocols for drone strikes inside Pakistan. This disparity 
not only puts pressure on the relationship between the United States and its 
long-standing ally in South Asia, but it also has serious implications in 
international politics—in the region and in the world—in terms of the violation of 
national sovereignty and human rights, as well as international law. The 
fundamental issue at the heart of this thesis is why and how the United States 
and Pakistan disagree on drone strikes. In light of this disagreement, how does 
the United States’ use of drones undermine its long-term interests in Pakistan 
and in the GWOT? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
The relationship between the United States and Pakistan is often 
described as “three marriages and two divorces.”1 The pattern of the 
relationship—and its cyclical high points and low points—suggest common goals, 
but different priorities, and its regional dynamics have always had a profound 
impact on the relationship of both countries; however, after 9/11, the relationship 
1Janani Ramachandran, “Determinants of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan” (undergraduate 
thesis, Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, Stanford University, 2014), 24. 
The three marriages referred to are Pakistan’s entry into Cold War in the1950s, General Zia and 
the Afghan War of 1979, and the alliance after the GWOT. The divorces are the 1965 War arms 
sanctions, and Soviet withdrawal and American sudden exit from the region; Mark N. Katz, 
“Pakistan and the ‘War on Terror’: War on Terror in Perspective,” Middle East Policy Council, 
http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/pakistan-and-war-terror?print. 
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reached its lowest ebb in almost 60 years of alliance.2 U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan have much to do with this development. 
B. THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP 
After independence in 1947, Pakistan’s security and economic interests 
coincided with the U.S. urge to check the spread of communism in Asia; hence 
Pakistan became an American protégé.3 Nonetheless, the relationship always 
faced turbulence due to both countries’ divergent interests on China and India—
Pakistan’s principal concern. Historic events like the trade sanctions and arms 
embargo on Pakistan after the 1965 Pakistan-India War, the dismemberment of 
Pakistan in 1971, and the abrupt disengagement of the United States from the 
region after the 1979 Soviet-Afghan War have adversely affected the 
relationship.4  
Until 9/11, Pakistan was under two layers of sanctions: one set barred 
U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan due to 1998 nuclear tests, and 
a second set imposed in 1999 due to the removal of the democratic government 
by General Pervez Musharraf.  
The legacy of this important phase of U.S.-Pakistan relations is 
characterized by a “trust deficit”—and it persisted even after the old allies 
2 Danial S. Markey, “The Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations in an Asian Context,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, July 14, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/the-future-of-us-pakistan-
relations-in-an-asian-context/pr1553. 
3 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1988), 64. 
4 “A Realistic Approach to U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” Centre of National Interest, 
www.cftni.org/8-22%20Summary%20(Final).pdf; Alex Wagner, “Bush Waives Nuclear-related 
Sanctions on India, Pakistan,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
2001_10/sanctionsoct01. Though the nuclear sanctions were waived and the relationship 
improved after 9/11 events, the relationship soured drastically on the drone issue, particularly 
after 2009. The thesis will specifically focus on the drone controversy that affected the 
relationship while fighting the GWOT. The GWOT after 9/11 offered the United States and 
Pakistan the chance to redefine their relationship, which had been characterized by tension, 
turbulence, and recrimination since Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998. 
 2 
                                            
rediscovered each other in the necessity of battling the Taliban in Afghanistan.5 
The United States believes that Pakistan is involved in a double game—allied 
with the United States in Afghanistan, but supporting U.S. enemies in Pakistan, 
and thus is reluctant to take stern action against pro-Pakistan militant groups like 
the Haqqani network and its affiliates,6 who, in their turn, support al-Qaeda. 
Indeed, in June 2011 the U.S. “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” 
specifically identified the locus of al-Qaeda’s “core leadership” and organization 
as “Afghanistan and Pakistan,” lumping Pakistan in the enemy category by 
association. The document also characterized Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) as al-Qaeda’s “base for operation” and a “safe haven.”7  
Pakistan denies these charges and continues to provide vital support to 
the coalition forces in Afghanistan. U.S. strategists do acknowledge Pakistan’s 
assistance—the same document, “National Security for Counterterrorism,” refers 
to Pakistan as a “partner” and identifies U.S. efforts as undertaken “in 
conjunction with the government of Pakistan.”8 Pakistan’s perceived 
unwillingness in the initial years of the GWOT to act against the al-Qaeda 
leadership and Haqqani network prompted the United States to authorize drone 
strikes in Pakistan-sovereign territory of FATA, which has created unintended 
consequences for both countries. 
The United States views drones as one of the most effective instruments 
in its counterterrorism arsenal, sparing precious blood and treasure on all sides 
of the conflict by pinpointing and eliminating terrorists hiding, often in plain sight, 
5 David O. Smith, “Facing Up to the Trust Deficit: The Key to an Enhanced U.S.-Pakistan 
Defense Relationship,” Strategic Insight VI, no. 4 (June 2007): 8‒11, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=474939; “U.S.-Pakistan Trust Deficit,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, October 15, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/us-pakistan-trust-deficit/p20411.     
6Jalal ud din Haqqani was founder of the network, who was once the blue-eyed boy of the 
United States during 1979 Afghan War. Presently, based in the tribal area of North Waziristan in 
Pakistan, the network has been carrying out violent activities against the coalition forces in east 
Afghanistan, mainly in Paktika, Ghazni, Khost, and even Kabul. They are pro-Pakistan and are 
suspected of being supported by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan.  
7 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2011), 9‒13, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.  
8 Ibid., 13. 
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among a noncombatant population.9 The problem is that this population is in the 
sovereign and allied state of Pakistan, and the targeting is not always so 
accurate, nor the devastation so circumscribed. The Pakistani public was not 
consulted and did not approve of these tactics. The drone strikes continued, now 
couched in terms that paint the entire human landscape as “the enemy.” These 
strikes have fomented a crisis of the greatest gravity.   
Internally, the democratic governments that succeeded Musharraf—whose 
dictatorial regime confronted few problems over drone strikes—have faced 
serious domestic and political outrage over drone strikes. Internationally, the 
policy threatens permanent harm to U.S.-Pakistan relations, to say nothing of 
international law. The implications have led to critical problems: repercussions for 
the long-standing alliance, costs of undermining international principles, and a 
preference for tactical benefits vis-à-vis strategic consequences. 
C. THE CHANGING VIEW FROM PAKISTAN  
Before 9/11, Pakistan had a measure of control in Afghanistan through the 
Taliban; however, after 9/11, when the Taliban failed to hand over Osama bin 
Laden, Pakistan had to choose between the Taliban and the U.S.-led coalition. 
Moreover, it reconciled itself to the loss of Afghanistan in exchange for the lifting 
of American sanctions and financial support from the international community. 
The hope was that it would lead to more collaboration with the United States and 
an increased supply of arms. Moreover, amid waning popular support, President 
Pervez Musharraf’s authoritarian regime also required legitimacy from the United 
States to establish him as a “good dictator.” Washington, however, did not see 
9 Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” February 11, 2014, 1‒3, http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/
drones.pdf. 
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this alliance in the same context. It re-established military cooperation on its own 
terms, but was not inclined to meet Pakistan’s demand.10 
In Pakistan, there is a genuine lack of popular support for the GWOT 
because it is seen as an American war being fought by Pakistan.11 Pakistan 
sees the sacrifices that it has made in the name of GWOT and its long-standing, 
if only sporadically requited, relationship with the United States. As the war 
progressed, Pakistan authorities discovered the heavy strategic cost that they 
had to pay for taking a side in the GWOT.12  
The strategic cost is attributed to two factors: repercussions and backlash 
from extremist elements for fighting America’s war, and the Taliban going out of 
complete control despite years of investment. Due to the GWOT, almost 5,000 
Pakistan military personnel have lost their lives; the death toll for civilians is 
around 45,000.13 Foreign investment dropped significantly and Pakistan’s 
economy has suffered almost $100 in billion losses in the 12 years of the 
GWOT.14 Pakistan deployed thousands of troops along the western frontiers 
bordering Afghanistan and provided logistical support to U.S. and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, including the bases for air and drone strikes 
in Afghanistan.15 Meanwhile, the United States has expanded drone strikes into 
10Christophe Jaffrelot, The History of Pakistan and Its Origins (London: Wimbledon 
Publishing Company, 2002), 278‒279; Musarrat Jabben, “Either You Are with Us or Against Us,” 
South Asian Studies 24, no.2 (July‒December 2009): 177, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/
PDF/1-Mussarat%20Jabeen.pdf. 
11Sikander Ahmed Shah, “War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan.” Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 9, no. 1 (2010): 84, http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/4/; Dawn 
Staff, “Is Pakistan Army Fighting own War?” Dawn, July 17, 2003.   
12 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Central Asia (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 115. 
13 Institute for Conflict Management, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 
2003‒2014.”South Asia Terrorism Portal,  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/
database/casualties.htm.  
14 Dawn Staff, “12-year War on Terror Cost $100 Billion,” Dawn, December 13, 2013, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/1072098.  
15 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 
199‒208. 
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Pakistan’s territory, with the implication that Pakistan is somehow part of the 
problem, rather than the solution.16 The sole reason behind this perception is 
that “Pakistan has not yet succeeded in tackling the problem of insurgency in 
Afghanistan and in dealing with the rise of ‘Talibanisation’ in its tribal areas.”17 
Pakistan’s security calculus has also changed. The extremist threat from 
within has to be balanced against the traditional concerns with India.18 Militancy 
spiked due to repressive measures against homegrown terrorists, coupled with 
the policy reversal on the Taliban and Kashmir issue.19 Overnight, Taliban and 
Kashmiri mujahedeens were disowned, haunting Pakistan to this day. Focus 
shifted from the external threat—India—to the threat from within, namely from 
homegrown terrorists. 
Resource constraints mark another issue for Pakistan, which, in turn, 
affects the operational priorities. Guarding the 2500-kilometer-long porous Pak-
Afghan border against terrorists crossing from Afghanistan and denying them 
safe heavens in the treacherous terrain of the FATA is extremely difficult. 
Moreover, the internal security challenges in the form of religious intolerance, 
sectarianism, and extremism have complicated the situation for political and 
military authorities.20   
16 Rick Francona, “Pakistan - Part of the Problem, Not the Solution,” Middle East 
Perspectives, November 29, 2011, http://francona.blogspot.com/2011/11/pakistan-part-of-
problem-not-solution.html.   
17 Rasa Jukneviciene, “Pakistan: A Crucial Player in Stability of the Region,” NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly Report, 2007, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1174. 
18 Express Tribune Staff, “New Doctrine: Army Identifies ‘Homegrown Militancy’ as Biggest 
Threat,” Express Tribune, January 3, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/488362/new-doctrine-
army-identifies-homegrown-militancy-as-biggest-threat/.  
19 Smruti Pattanaik, “War on Terror and Its Impact on Pakistan Kashmir Policy,” Institute of 
Defense Studies and Analysis 32, no. 3 (May 2008), http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/
WaronTerroranditsImpactonPakistanKashmirPolicy_sspattanaik_0508.  
20 Umbareen Javed, “Partnership in War on Terror and Mounting Militant Extremism in 
Pakistan,” South Asian Studies 26, no. 2 (2011), http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/
V_26_No_2_1Dr.%20Umbreen%20Javaid.pdf.  
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Despite all the sacrifice and support from Pakistan, the United States 
remains attached to the policy of “do more.”21 This policy demands that Pakistan 
extend military operations in the North Waziristan Agency of the FATA region, 
with an aim to flush out terrorists established over decades. The specific demand 
was to take on the Haqqani Tribe and its affiliates, whom they support.22 The 
Haqqani network, once secretly supported by the United States during the Soviet 
resistance, joined hands with al-Qaeda and became a nemesis after 9/11. The 
network is considered to be in close contact with Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISI), which historically employs non-state actors against 
India and elsewhere if required.23 The U.S. priority of engaging targets and 
fighting the war on its own terms could not match Pakistan’s operational 
planning, which affected the smooth cooperation between both allies. Hence, it is 
important to understand why the U.S. drone strikes are causing mutual 
recrimination between allies. 
D. THE TROUBLE WITH DRONES 
The United States conducted the first drone attack in 2004 in FATA, and 
the rate increased significantly over the decade. According to the latest data, the 
United States has carried out 300 to 374 strikes within Pakistan’s borders 
between 2004 and 2012; the casualty count varies from 400 to 900, with 600 
people seriously injured.24  
21 Farhana Ali, “Pakistan: On or Off? Examining the Future of U.S. – Pakistan Relations in 
the War on Terror and Beyond,” Criterion Quarterly 2, no 3 (October 2013), http://www.criterion-
quarterly.com/pakistan-on-or-off-examining-the-future-of-u-s-pakistan-relations-in-the-war-on-
terror-and-beyond/. 
22 Ashley J. Tillis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised 
Performance,” Carnegie Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_pakistan_final.pdf.  
23 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 17; Deccan Herald Staff, “ISI Has Links with Haqqani Network: U.S. 
General,” Deccan Herald, April 16, 2013, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/326528/isi-has-
links-haqqani-network.html.  
24 Amnesty International Report, “Living Under Drones,” October 22, 2013, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/report/will-i-be-next-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan. 
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From the U.S. perspective, drones save human efforts, time, and do not 
place human lives—soldiers—at risk by taking on the high value targets 
(HVTs).25 Drone strikes reflect the divergent strategic view of the GWOT and its 
players. The United States can focus only on short-term interests—eliminating 
immediate threats in the person of terrorists; however, Pakistan has to balance 
short-term interests against the long-term consequences. 
In principle, both countries agree on the use of drones against terrorists in 
ungoverned areas of the Pakistan tribal region being an effective 
counterterrorism weapon; however, there are serious issues over drone 
deployment and strike protocols.26 The fundamental issue, however, is not the 
employment of drones in Pakistan’s territory but its operational control—strike 
protocols—that form the real bone of contention. For the present, the United 
States controls the drones, and selects the target following its own protocols—
without consulting Pakistan.27 The United States believes that sharing classified 
information on potential targets with Pakistan is likely to jeopardize the mission—
a claim seemingly borne out of initial setbacks of HVTs’ escape through sharing 
of information with Pakistan, and further substantiated by Osama bin Laden’s 
presence in Pakistan.28 The United States still suspects Pakistan of making a 
distinction between the terrorists as good and bad Taliban.29 The implication is 
that Pakistan drags its feet or even actively obstructs when Taliban figures in the 
“good” category are involved. However, in the course of the GWOT, Pakistani 
25 Ibid.  
26 James lgoe Walsh, “Lawfare: The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency 
and Counterterrorism Campaigns,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 2013, 
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/lawfare-effectiveness-drone-strikes-counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism-campaigns/p31701.    
27 “Protocols for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) by Law-Enforcement 
Agencies,” Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, October 7, 2013, 
http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/cple/documents/UAS%20Protocols%20GA.pdf.  
28 Karen De Young and Karin Brulliard, “U.S. Presses Pakistan for Information on Osama bin 
Laden Compound,” Washington Post, May 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
pakistan-defends-role-condemns-unilateral-us-action/2011/05/03/AFrZ4lgF_story.html.  
29 Khaled Ahmed, “The Fiction of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban,” Friday Times, November 9, 
2012, http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20121109&page=2.  
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agencies have apprehended more than 600 top al-Qaeda terrorists, of whom 
many have been handed over to U.S. authorities.30 
The distinction between al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists—”our enemy and 
their enemy”—is a complicated issue between the United States and Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s declared terrorists are somehow low in priority on the U.S. hit list; 
however, those adjudged by the United States as terrorists are Pakistan’s—so-
called—assets, and are priority targets for drones. The problem does not relate 
to drones, it relates to target selection.31   
Pakistan finds itself in a precarious situation by becoming a front-line ally 
in the GWOT, but unable to protect its innocent citizens against the drone strikes 
due to ineffective intelligence. Pakistan desires partial, if not complete 
operational control of the drones, which would be more acceptable to the 
government at least, rather than the indiscriminate U.S. killings on Pakistan’s soil 
from afar.32 Such an arrangement would entail intelligence sharing on potential 
or suspected targets, and the time of engagement—the one thing that American 
officials seem entirely unwilling even to consider. If considered by the United 
States, it will help prevent accidental targeting of religious and traditional 
gatherings in FATA that has invited immense criticism worldwide in the past. 
According to Riaz Mohammad Khan, “Friction and mistrust [characterize] 
the post-9/11 cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan,” and have led to 
competing interests in the GWOT.33 Disagreement over the drone issue has 
30 Kim Barker and Noreen S. Ahmedullah, “Pakistan Touts its Terror Arrests,” Chicago 
Tribune, August 5, 2004, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-08-05/news/
0408050257_1_terror-arrests-al-qaeda-hayyat.  
31 Qaiser Farooq Gondal, “Pakistan Uses Militants as Strategic Assets,” Washington Times, 
January 12, 2012, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/letters-pakistan/2012/
jan/12/pakistan-uses-militants-strategic-assets/; Ismail Khan, “Analysis: Our Enemy and Their 
Enemy,” Dawn, September 29, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1135225/analysis-our-enemy-
their-enemy.  
32 Sara Sorcher, “Pakistan Wants Drones, and It Doesn’t Need America’s Permission to Get 
Them,” National Journal, May 15, 2014, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/pakistan-
wants-drones-and-it-doesn-t-need-america-s-permission-to-get-them-20140515.  
33 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to 
Modernity (Washington, DC: Wilson Woodrow Centre Press, 2011), 11.  
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further stoked the anti-Americanism that directly affects the U.S. long-term 
interests in Pakistan.34 The pages that follow show that the trust deficit that leads 
to competing self-interests is the primary cause of the controversy over the U.S. 
drone strikes in Pakistan territory. Competing self-interests stem from varying 
beliefs, perceptions, and needs on both sides. On the one hand, drone strikes 
cause disruption and degradation of terrorist organizations; however, they also 
breed recruitment, incite extremism, and feed into political revulsions.35 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 9/11, scores of books, policy papers, and articles have been written 
on terrorism. Pakistan figures prominently in such literature, typically blamed 
directly or indirectly as the epicenter for terrorism.36 Many writers have criticized 
Washington’s friendly policies toward Pakistan; as Carlotta Gall stated, “… 
Pakistan, supposedly an ally, has proved to be perfidious, driving the violence in 
Afghanistan for its own cynical, hegemonic reasons…. Pakistan, not Afghanistan, 
has been the true enemy.”37 The U.S. State Department has a different view—
diplomats are interested in promoting a comprehensive partnership beyond the 
energy sector and cooperation in the GWOT, because a nuclear-unstable 
Pakistan has the capacity to affect peace in the region.38 To this end, Anatol 
Lieven also writes that Pakistan is not only relevant in the Afghanistan equation 
but also important to the region and the West.39  
34 Janani, “Determinants of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan,” 17.  
35 Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes.”  
36 Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier (New York: Penguin 
Group (USA), 2009), 11‒21 and 147–87. 
37 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001 – 2014 (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), xiv.  
38 U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, “U.S. Relations with Pakistan,” September 10, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm; Nancy J. Powell, “U.S. Foreign Policy towards 
Pakistan” (speech, Karachi Council on Foreign Relations in Pakistan, November 13, 2003), 
Archive of U.S. Department of State, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/26277.htm.  
39 Anatol Leiven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New York: Perseus Book Club, 2011), 11‒21. 
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There is little literature on the U.S. policies that consider Pakistan’s 
challenges in the GWOT—internally due to extremism and externally due to its 
geo-strategic location. However, President Barack Obama’s famous response to 
an Indian that “Pakistan is a strategically important country not just for the U.S., 
but also for the world,” is a stark reminder of this fact.40 Even so, a few writers, 
such as T. V. Paul, have described the geostrategic location of Pakistan as a 
curse and the main impediment towards progress.41 Literature on strong anti-
American sentiments in Pakistan exists, and the latest in the series is No Exit 
from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad by Daniel S. 
Markey,42 but how to transform this strong anti-American sentiment into strong 
support to achieve success in the GWOT has not been explored much. The 
willingness of Pakistanis to confront the GWOT head on is vital to the ultimate 
outcome of this war.  
1. U.S.-Pakistan Relations: A History of Alliance and Interests 
Hussain Haqqani writes, “The foundation of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship 
was laid on faulty assumptions: few shared interests and different political 
needs.”43 However, it has served the interests of both countries over a period of 
60 years. The alliance has successes and failures, but has sustained the test of 
40 Sheryle Gay Stolberg, “Obama Pointedly Questioned by Students in India,” New York 
Times, November 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/world/asia/08prexy.html; Rahi 
Gekwad, “Stable Pakistan Good for India: Obama,” Hindustan Times, November 8, 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/stable-pakistan-good-for-india-obama/article873238.ece. 
41 T. V. Paul, The Warrior State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 94–126.   
42 Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
43 Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History 
of Misunderstanding (New York: Perseus Book Club, 2013), 350; Husain Haqqani was a 
journalist, and a political advisor with two of Pakistan’s premiers. He has served as an 
Ambassador of Pakistan to Sri Lanka (1992–1993) and the United States (2008–2011). A 
controversial figure, who was exiled in 1999 for criticizing President Musharraf’s regime. In 2011, 
he was forced to resign for his anti establishment (Army) agenda, famously known as Momogate 
controversy. His other books are Pakistan: Between Mosque to Military, and India and Pakistan: 
Is Peace Real this Time. Presently, he is Director of the Center of International Relations and a 
Professor of the Practice of International Relations at Boston University.  
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time despite serious grievances.44 Both countries have faced challenges that are 
common, linked or shared, but have differences in handling these challenges.45  
Pakistan was considered the strongest ally of the United Sates, “as 
President Ayub [1958‒1969] put in his autobiography, Friends Not Masters, 
Pakistan had become America’s most allied ally in Asia.”46 However, Richard 
Nixon who had visited Pakistan as vice-president and who remained grateful to 
Pakistan for its role in opening China also noted that “… it is sometimes better to 
be an enemy of the United States than to be a friend,” suggesting that the 
relationship and cooperation has never reflected continuity and shared vision.47   
The relationship mostly remained restricted to the military establishment, 
especially in Pakistan, because the political class does not control the foreign 
policy completely.48 Consequently, the relationship is devoid of strategic 
consensus and public support on both sides.49 Both countries blame each other 
for the failures and that has created a trust deficit between them.  
Former ambassador Hussain Haqqani states that “Pakistan and the 
United States are not allies in a real sense; America is interested in the privileges 
from a country they dtrust, whereas Pakistani elites [and military establishment] 
44 Ibid., 2–4. 
45 Touqir Hussain, “The U.S.-Pakistan Relations: a Historical Review,” Criterion Quarterly 8, 
no. 4 (October 2013), http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/the-us-pakistan-relations—an-historical-
review/. 
46 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947‒2000 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press,2001), 74. 
47 Richard Nixon, Leaders: Profiles and Reminiscences of Men who have Shaped the 
Modern World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 131.  
48 Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan’s Foreign and Security Policies after the 2013 General Election: 
the Judge, the Politician and the Military,” International Affairs 89, no.4 (2013): 993‒994, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/International%20Affairs/2013/
89_4/89_4_10_Grare.pdf; Dr Tariq Rahman, “ Who Controls the Foreign Policy in Pakistan,” 




                                            
are interested in American aid by exploiting and fuelling anti Americanism.”50 He 
strongly suggests that the relationship should be based on reality in order to 
reduce the expectations from each other. On the other hand, Congressman Gary 
Ackerman took a critical view of the relationship as mentioned in Daniel Markey’s 
book: “Pakistan is like a black hole for American aid. Our tax dollars go in … Our 
prayers go in. Nothing good ever comes out.”51  
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, Pakistan was beset with the 
problems of fundamentalism and extremism that made it almost isolated from the 
international community. Economically, it was in dire straits—facing nuclear 
sanctions after nuclear tests in 1998. The complicated situation was further 
compounded in 1999, when Pervez Musharraf, a military dictator, seized power 
in a bloodless coup.  
Then 9/11 happened and Afghanistan became the focal point once again. 
The strategic mistake of the 1979 Afghan War boomeranged, but this time the 
United States has to fight against those elements that Washington previously had 
supported. The United States returned to Pakistan for the third time; its proximity 
to Afghanistan and historic influence over various governments made Pakistan 
an important ally. Ironically, both the United States and Pakistan found 
themselves fighting against an enemy that was their own creation during the 
Afghan War in 1979.52  
On several occasions, Pakistan, with an eye toward its alliance with the 
United States, embarked on policies that favored U.S. interests—for example, 
the provision of the base in 1957 for U2 surveillance aircraft against the erstwhile 
50 Sara Carter, “Pakistan is No Ally of the U.S. and the Toxic Relationship Threatens 
National Security: Former Pakistani Ambassador,” Blaze, December 2, 2013, 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/12/02/pakistan-is-no-ally-of-the-u-s-and-the-toxic-
relationship-threatens-national-security-former-pakistani-ambassador/. 
51 Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, 4. 
52 Dr Hidayat Khan, “Pakistan’s Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11,” IPRI XIII, 
no. 1 (2013): 38, www.ipripak.org/journal/winter%202013/art3.pdf; Michael Moran, “ Bin Laden 
Comes Home to Roost,” NBC News, August 24, 1998, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340101/t/bin-
laden-comes-home-roost/#.VFcY9irIuoA; Seth Jones and Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in 
Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2010), 33–41.   
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Soviet Union, the 1979 Afghan War, and the GWOT.53 These decisions may or 
may not have advanced Pakistan’s short- or long-term priorities and they resulted 
in a mixed bag of U.S. responses.  
In South Asia, Pakistan is an important ally, vital for security interests of 
the United States. Long-term U.S. interests in Pakistan are “related to regional 
and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear 
weapons proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American 
terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights 
protection; and economic development.”54 To look after these interests, the 
United States has been supporting Pakistan economically. In total Pakistan has 
received $67 billion from 1951 to 2011, and $7.5 billion between 2010 and 2014 
as part of the Kerry-Lugar Bill.55 Despite the economic assistance, the drone 
issue coupled with on-and-off U.S.-Pakistan cooperation has stoked the anti-
American sentiments affecting the long-term U.S. interests.56  
2. The World after 9/11 
Richard Haass states that not only the Iraq wars, but also the war in 
Afghanistan, are wars of choice. The United States could have avoided them; 
neither war was completely winnable.57 But the GWOT presented another 
chance for Pakistan to resurrect itself as a relevant and responsible state in 
international community. To deal with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the United 
States required Pakistan’s assistance and support, which was provided once 
53 Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 1–16, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
press/books/2012/deadlyembracerevised/deadlyembrace_chapter.pdf. 
54 K. Allan Kronstadt, Pakistan – U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. R41832) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2012), 5, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf. 
55 “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers,” Center For Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/
page/aid-pakistan-numbers. 
56 Markey, No Exit from Pakistan America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, 1–29. 
57 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity and War of Choice (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2009), 11.  
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again—probably under duress.58 Also, this time “the U.S. motive for seeking 
Pakistani alliance has been different from Pakistan’s reasons for accepting it.”59 
America wanted a stable Afghanistan after the elimination of such terrorist 
elements as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan, on the other hand, had its own 
issues with the GWOT; the army saw the increased Indian influence in its 
neighborhood—Afghanistan—as a great threat to its national security.60    
After 9/11, Pakistan made a strategic shift by joining the GWOT against 
the Taliban. This shift was not endorsed by the local and foreign Talibans, who 
challenged the writ of the government in almost every corner of the country.61 
Extremism and sectarianism, which are the main drivers of terrorism in Pakistan, 
also flourished, increasing security challenges many times over.62 Despite all 
these challenges, Pakistan extended its full support to the coalition in the GWOT. 
Pakistan offered air bases for combat missions in Afghanistan, logistics support, 
and intelligence sharing with U.S. agencies.63 In 2009, President Obama said, 
“… Our success in Afghanistan is linked to our partnership with Pakistan.”64  
58 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 199–208; Suzanne Goldenburg, “Bush Threatens to Bomb 
Pakistan,” Guardian, September 21, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/22/
pakistan.usa. 
59 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, 3.  
60 Tuba Aslam Khan, “India-Pakistan’s Power Play in Afghanistan a Recipe for Disaster,” 
Afghan Zariza, January 1, 2014, http://www.afghanzariza.com/2014/01/30/indiapakistans-
powerplay-in-afghanistan-a-recipe-for-disaster#sthash.3ufFEkRI.dpuf. 
61 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 222–37. 
62 Saima Afzal, Hamid Iqbal, and Mavara Inayat, “Sectarianism and its Implications for 
Pakistan Security: Policy Recommendations Using Exploratory Study,” Journal of Humanities and 
Social Science 4, no. 4 (December 2012): 5–8, http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol4-
issue4/D0441926.pdf; Saima Afzal, Hamid Iqbal, and Mavara Inayat, “Terrorism and Extremism 
as a Non-Traditional Security Threat Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan’s Security” International 
Journal of Business and Social Science 3, no. 24 (December 2012): 197, http://ijbssnet.com/
journals/Vol_3_No_24_Special_Issue_December_2012/21.pdf; Huma Yousaf, “Sectarian 
Violence: Pakistan’s greatest Security Threat? Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center 
(NOREF), July 9, 2012, 5–6, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/
application/949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf. 
63 Khan, “Pakistan’s Contribution to Global War on Terror,” 41–43.  
64 The White House, “Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,” Office of the Press Secretary New York, December 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 
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Five years earlier the U.S. government had commenced the first-known 
drone strikes within Pakistan’s sovereign territorial boundaries at South 
Waziristan. The United States extended the program of targeted killing of Taliban 
and al-Qaeda members well beyond the battlefields of Afghanistan. The reason, 
as stated by Hussain Haqani, from America’s perspective, Pakistan has 
transformed its status from a friend to an ally to an epicenter of terror. From 
Pakistan’s perspective, the United States has been instrumental in security and 
economic assistance, looking for its own opportunities and interests through 
military dictators, and ironically, is now a threat to national security.65 
Throughout the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, officials on both sides have 
misunderstood the priorities and limitations of the other side. To describe the 
relationship, it is said that. “Pakistan has often benefitted from the American 
tendency to ignore history and focus only on immediate goals, Americans have 
often assumed that building up … military and economic capacity provides them 
leverage even after periodically finding out the limits of U.S. influence.”66 The 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan can only move forward once 
it is redefined by accepting each other’s divergent interests and mutual 
mistrust.67  
3. Legal Perspectives 
In President Pervez Musharraf’s authoritarian regime (1999–2008), the 
government did not reveal anything publicly about drone policy. On April 12, 
2013—after Musharraf had been voted out of office—the ex-president in an 
interview on CNN, acknowledged that there was an understanding on drone 
strikes, but they were to be used “only on a few occasions, when a target was 
65 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, 1–56. 
66 Ibid., 2.  
67 Ibid., 350.  
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absolutely isolated and [there was] no chance of collateral damage.”68 This 
understanding over drone strikes suggests that Pakistan has policy issues that 
were not revealed openly in public due to its classified nature, and out of concern 
for its political consequences as the opposition to drones is debated extensively 
in Pakistan. The secretive stance by the Pakistan government has led to the 
complexity of the drone issue. 
In international politics, powerful countries interpret the international law to 
their own benefit. Still, in the case of drone strikes, customary law, and UN 
resolutions are relevant. The United States and Pakistan—along with much of 
the rest of the world—take divergent views of the legality of drone strikes. The 
United States insists that its targeted attacks against al-Qaeda leaders—
wherever they are—comport with international law on two related points. First, as 
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) declares, the nation is at 
war with al-Qaeda “and its associated forces, and [the U.S.] Congress has 
authorized the president to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
entities.”69 Pakistan, on the other hand, terms drone strikes as a violation of its 
sovereignty, also endorsed by the UN.70 
The legal issue rests on three factors: self-defense, the violation of state 
sovereignty, and human rights. Because all al-Qaeda or affiliated leaders 
represent a threat of violent attack against the United States, the United States 
68 Jon Boone, “Pervez Musharraf Admits ‘a few’ U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” Guardian, 
April 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/12/musharraf-admits-permitting-
drone-strikes. 
69 U.S. Department of Justice, “White Paper: The Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force,” 
undated (summarizing a 2010 memorandum), 2, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/
news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. The quoted passage refers to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107–40, §2a, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). To be sure, the white 
paper concerns itself with the question of the legality, under U.S. law, of the U.S. government 
targeting a U.S. citizen in a drone strike or other similar attack. The legal basis begins with the 
same premises as for any targeted killing, however. 
70 Louis Charbonneau, “U.S. Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty: UN,” Reuters, 
March 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/us-un-drones-
idUSBRE92E0Y320130315. 
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may use force against them as a matter of national self-defense.71 Such a strike 
counts as preemptive because the subject may not be engaged in active warfare 
against the United States at a given moment. According to leading international 
law scholar, Anthony Arend, under the established system of “customary 
international law that developed before the UN Charter was adopted, it was 
accepted that the pre-emptive use of force was permissible in self-defense [if the 
threat were imminent].”72 This logic is written into the UN Charter, as well.73  
Article 51 of the UN Charter enshrines the right to self-defense but only 
when an armed attack has occurred.”74 This formulation has divided law experts 
in two groups. One says it would be unlawful to engage in preemptive strikes, 
whereas the other goes in favor of preemptive strikes.75 
However, two criteria for permissible self-defense merit consideration: 
necessity and proportionality, both of which are prerequisites for preemptive 
action.76 For necessity, the state would be required to establish that the use of 
force by the other state was imminent, and that forcible action had the potential 
to forestall an attack.”77 For proportionality, the Additional Protocol of Article 51 
focuses on “the protection of civilian population[s],” which suggests that if a 
legitimate target is identified, the presence of a large number of civilians in such 
a space makes the strike disproportionately threatening.78  
71 U.S. Department of Justice, “White Paper,” 3. 
72 Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive use of Military Force,” 
Washington Quarterly, 26, no. 2 (2003): 90, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
highlight/03spring_arend.pdf. 
73 Ibid. 
74 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspective on International Law, 5th ed. (United 
States: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 456. 
75 Arend, “International Law,” 90.  
76 Louis-Philippe Rouillard, “The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self Defense in Contemporary 
International Law,” Miskolc Journal of International Law, 1, no. 2 (2004): 104, http://www.uni-
miskolc.hu/~wwwdrint/20042rouillard1.htm. 
77 Ibid., 104–20. 
78 International Committee of Red Cross, Protocol additional to Geneva Convention of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
1), June 8, 1977, http://www.icrc.org/ihl/Web ART/ 470 -750065. 
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The so-called Bush Doctrine held that the United States will “make no 
distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them, and hold both to 
account.”79 The doctrine of state responsibility holds that every state is 
responsible for its territory—not to be used knowingly (by non-state actors) 
against another state. Thus, harboring terrorists constitutes violation of 
international law.80 The logic underlines the U.S. justifications for violating 
Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty with every drone strike.  
The United States points to two important caveats in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter: consent of the host state (in this case, to carry out drone strikes) and the 
unwillingness or inability of the host state to take appropriate action.81 The 
Musharraf regime was presumed to have given at least tacit approval of U.S. 
drone strikes, but the new democratic governments have strongly opposed drone 
strikes. As regards this “unwillingness,” Pakistan has a mixed record of response 
to terrorism. At times Pakistan has failed to take decisive actions against non-
state actors, but at other times, Pakistan has taken out such “high-value” figures 
as Khalid Shiekh Muhammad, the mastermind behind 9/11, and Umar Patek, 
involved in Bali bombings.82 The Article 51 issue, then, is clearly under dispute.  
International law also addresses “collateral damage,” in which innocent 
civilians are killed. Targeted killings within the context of armed conflict and 
outside armed conflict have legal implications. The United States claims that the 
79 Washington Post Staff, “Decision points, by Pres. George W. Bush: on Foreign Policy,” 
Washington Post, December 21, 2006, http://www.ontheissues.org/Archive/
Decision_Points_Foriegn_Policy.htm. 
80 Sean D. Murphy, Principles of International Law (Washington, DC: Thomson West, 2006), 
113; International Court of Justice, “Cases: Corfu Channel Case (UK of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Albania.” http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=1&p3=4. 
81 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford law School and 
Global Justice Clinic at NYC School of Law, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to 
Civilians from U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan,” 2002, http://www.livingunderdrones.org/
download-report/. 
82 Terry Mc Dermott and Josh Mayer, “Inside the Mission to Catch Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed,” Atlantic, April 2, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/
inside-the-mission-to-catch-khalid-sheikh-mohammed/255319/; Adam Goldman and Niniek 




                                            
GWOT is a non-international armed conflict and as a result the officials have 
applied international humanitarian law (IHL), without establishing its requite 
threshold. In fact, in the absence of an armed conflict International Human Right 
Law (IHRL) is invoked, which makes the killing of innocent civilians a war crime. 
There also is the real question of whether the United States is in armed conflict 
with everyone who has been targeted.83  
4. Strategic Consequences 
Bruce O. Riedel argues that historically, American presidents have 
pursued policies of “short-term interests in Pakistan that contributed to 
instability.”84 After 9/11, the United States and Pakistan have faced common 
challenges in the GWOT that are either shared or linked, and hence the 
blowback is not limited to Pakistan only. The failed Times Square bombing by a 
Pakistani-born U.S. citizen in 2010 was the first shock for the United States; 
defendant Faisal Shahzad responded to a judge that he justified his act because 
the U.S. kills innocents through drones.85  
The differences in the handling of such challenges by both allies have 
raised the cost for Pakistan. The United States is only focused on hunting down 
terrorists in the GWOT in its own way, disregarding the consequences. It 
considers drone strikes as an effective counterterrorism tool, however, “If the 
price of [the] drone campaign that increasingly kills only low-level Taliban is 
alienating 180 million Pakistanis—that is too high a price to pay.”86 The fact is 
that the United States considers drones strikes “necessary to make the U.S. 
safer by disrupting militant activity.”87 Another linked issue is that the United 
83 “Living Under Drones,” 110–15. 
84 Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 30–70. 
85 Michael J. Boyle, “The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” International Affairs 
89, no. 1 (2013), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/
2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf. 
86“Living Under Drones,” 132.  
87 Ibid., 125. 
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States has not laid the foundation of enduring stability in Afghanistan, hence 
making it a potential hideout for rogue elements, which can threaten the global 
and U.S. security in future.88  
On the other hand, Pakistan faced dire strategic consequences because 
of drone strikes in the form of political unrest and polarization of the masses. 
Moreover, extremism also increased many times over; al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
took up arms against the Pakistan military as the drone strikes played a major 
role in forming the perception that Pakistan is fighting America’s war.89 Unstable 
Afghanistan is another security and economic problem for Pakistan. Pakistan has 
a limited capacity to take on these challenges.  
Drone strikes portend a rift—if not a rupture—in the relationship between 
the United States and Pakistan. They are interdependent on each other because 
of mutual interests; however, they cannot afford to part ways. The United States 
is more focused on India in the region as a counterweight to China; however, 
Pakistan is a nuclear state that remains vulnerable to its internal challenges.90  
5. The Moral Aspect 
Finally, morality and ethics are an important factor in international politics. 
The drones are mainly employed in signature strikes as well as personality 
strikes. Personality strikes are pinpoint targets and are not morally problematic 
provided adequate scrutiny is utilized in ascertaining the target’s identity. The 
problem lies with signature strikes, which are authorized against an individual 
who fits in a peculiar behavior profile. In FATA, culturally, everyone carries a 
weapon and would become a potential target as they fit the description, so to 
speak. The difference between combatant and non-combatant gets blurred in 
88 Hussain, “The U.S. Pakistan Relations.” 
89 Syed Salem Shehzad, Inside al-Qaeda and Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11 (New 
York: Palgrave McMillan, 2011), 82–83. 
90 Farhana Ali, “Pakistan: On or Off.”  
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counterterror operations but the principle of distinction is a moral (and legal) 
requirement according to the Geneva Convention.91  
Still a range of opinion exists. On the one hand, Bradley Strawser, the 
main proponent of the use of armed drones, argues that in counterterrorism 
operations, the United States has a moral duty to use drones.92 In his book 
Killing by Remote Control, he concludes:  “Using drones to go after terrorists not 
only [is] ethically permissible but also might be ethically obligatory, because of 
their advantages in identifying targets and striking with precision.”93 According to 
a U.S. field manual on counterinsurgency operations (COIN), “Strict adherence to 
ethics is vital to the outcome of COIN as tactical actions in such operations can 
have strategic impact.”94 
The collection of scholarly articles, “Ethical and Legal Aspects of 
Unmanned Systems—Interviews,” argues that due to the principle of distinction 
and proportionality drones are against the spirit of the Geneva Convention. The 
machine cannot distinguish between combatant and innocent. Moreover, drones 
cannot measure the proportionality by comparing military advantage gained vis-
à-vis number of civilian deaths. Though the pragmatic reasons for drone strikes 
are understandable, they cannot morally justify the death of innocents who are 
not at war with the aggressor state. Setting up wrong precedents has 
ramifications in international politics.95 
91 Bradley Jay Strawser, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 161–70; John Brennan, “The Efficacy and Ethics of 
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy,” Woodrow Wilson Center, April 30, 2012, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. 
92 Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles,” 
Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (December 2010): 367, http://www.bradleystrawser.com/pub/
Strawser%20Moral%20Predators%20JME.pdf. 
93 Scott Shane, “The Moral Case for Drones,” New York Times Sunday Review, July 14, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html. 
94 Department of Army, U.S. Counter Insurgency (FM 3–24) (Washington, DC: Marine Corps 
War Fighting Publication, 2014), 45.  





                                            
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis adopts an analytical approach by taking historical and 
contemporary perspectives of the three players involved in the issue: the United 
States, Pakistan, and International community. The study begins with the 
analysis of such primary sources as declassified documents of the U.S. 
Department of Justice as well as secondary sources like books, official 
statements, reports, and newspaper editorials of both the United States and 
Pakistan. Moreover, the opinion of various think tanks including The Pakistan 
Institute of International Affairs, American Society of International Law, and 
Criterion Quarterly, followed by study groups such as Stanford, further bolster the 
analysis. Views expressed by experts of both countries on the subject in the form 
of books and papers authored and edited by Pervez Musharraf, Bradley Jay 
Strawser, Carlotta Gall, Theresa Reinold, Christine Fair, Bruce Riedel, and 
Touqir Hussain provide an essential foundation for the study. Gall and Strawser 
came up with some novel revelations and forceful arguments in their books: 
Fighting the Wrong Enemy and Killing by Remote Control, respectively, that will 
make the research intriguing.  
To analyze the trust deficit between United States and Pakistan, all events 
and issues that have marred the relationship over a period of time are taken into 
account. Books written by Hussain Haqqani and Dennis Kux in this regard help to 
identify whether the relationship was issue based or interest based provide a 
base for the research. On the legality issue of drone strikes, all angles, and 
perspectives afford a rational, legitimate, and legal view. The issues of the trust 
deficit, which degenerates into self-serving interests, followed by legal and moral 
aspects that are widely debated not only in these two countries but the world 
over for its impact on international politics and relations, are examined. The view 
point of United Nations, International Criminal Court (ICC), and the legal experts, 
as published or telecast in form of an official statement from time to time, is taken 
into account to enlarge the canvas for arriving at a balanced solution.  
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II reflects on the historical context of the drone and its evolution. It 
follows the explanation for drone strikes inside Pakistan.  
Chapter III deals with the legal perspective of the drone issue. All 
dimensions of customary and contemporary international law are explored in 
view of different legal positions by both countries. The caveats in international 
law and past case studies bring the issue to a realistic comparison. Finally, the 
implications of violating international law and the impact on world politics are 
highlighted.  
Chapter IV contains the cost-benefit analysis of the drone issue that has 
brought two long-standing allies to the saturation point. All the benefits and 
consequences for both the countries receive detailed attention.  
Chapter V concludes the thesis. It reflects upon ethical and moral issues 
of drone strategy, which has set dangerous precedents for the future. It follows 
with recommendations for the policy makers of both countries as well as the 
international community to tread a balanced path that does not adversely affect 
the allies or their interests. It also proposes standards for the international 
community on drone operations.  
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II. TARGETED KILLINGS AND DRONE EVOLUTION 
The United States has deployed armed drones for targeted killings “as the 
weapon of choice” in the GWOT; however, the drone is not the only weapon 
used by the U.S. forces to neutralize targets from afar. Other such weapons 
include the AC-130 Gunship, and Tomahawk cruise missile. Used initially in 
Vietnam, the AC-130 also was used in 2007 and 2009 in Somalia against al-
Qaeda leaders. In 1998, the Clinton Administration used the Tomahawk in 
Afghanistan against al-Qaeda. Despite the employment of these killer weapons, 
terrorism has increased and none of the proclaimed terrorist organizations has 
been eliminated; indeed, new organizations have emerged on the world scene.96  
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TARGETED KILLINGS  
Intelligence agencies are used principally for gathering intelligence, which 
is in line with the international law. Their involvement in targeted killing97 has 
increased over time, which is against international as well as U.S. domestic 
law.98 However, countries use agencies for covert operations—political 
assassinations and targeted killings—as an effective measure to handle issues in 
a safe and speedy manner.99 The KGB—a security agency of the erstwhile 
Soviet Union—was notorious for its “mastery of resorting to abductions and 
96 Kelsey D. Atherton, “Stop Calling it the Drone Memo,” Popular Science, 2013, 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-02/drone-memo-about-more-just-drones; Jackie 
Northam, “As Drone Strikes Increase, So Do Concerns Over Use,” NPR News, June 12, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/12/154812235/as-drone-strikes-grow-so-do-concerns-over-use. 
97 Jonathan Masters in his article “Targeted killings” defines this phenomenon in the light of 
UN Special reports “Targeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in 
times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody. 
‘Targeted killing’ is not a term distinctly defined under international law, but gained currency in 
2000 after Israel made public a policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the Palestinian territories,” 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
98 “Intelligence Services and Democracy,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper no. 13, April 2002, http://www.iskran.ru/cd_data/disk2/rr/
006.pdf; Karolis Kupcikas, “The Importance of Intelligence to International Security,”  E-
International Relations Students, November 8, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/08/importance-
of-intelligence-to-international-security/. 
99 Center for Study of Intelligence, “Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping,” Central 
Intelligence Agency, May 8, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/index.html. 
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conducting murders of those targets which were considered to be potential 
threats to the Soviet regime.”100 All these actions were executed inside and 
outside the country against compatriots and foreigners; however, after Stalin, the 
trend of targeted killings declined due to a lack of volunteers who would kill 
unnecessarily, and on foreign soil.101 Another such example is Israel’s Mossad, 
which is still engaged in such practices; killing a top Hamas official in Dubai in 
2010 is a case in point.102 Mossad is very proficient in targeted killings of those 
who—in their assessment—would be a threat to Israel’s national security.103 
Targeted killing done mostly through intelligence agencies has a 
precedent in the United States. They eliminate the real and perceived threat 
through a process that is efficient, precise, and covert, as manifested by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the past.104 The same fact is corroborated 
by Steve Coll: 
Putting such theory into practice was the role of CIA, and the 
agency’s tally of top leftists, nationalists, or otherwise unreliable 
leaders is well known, from Mohammad Mosadegh of Iran in 1953, 
and Jacob Guzman of Guatemala in 1954, to Ngo Diem of South 
Vietnam in 1963, and Salvador Allende, of Chile in 1973.105 
These schemes of assassinations and targeted killings did not go 
according to plan. The killing of Patrice Lumumba, in which the Americans were 
100 Ibid. 
101 S. G. Wheatcroft, “Towards Explaining the Changing levels of Stalinists Repression in the 
1930s: Mass Killings,” Academia. edu,113–16, http://www.academia.edu/5955352/
Towards_Explaining_the_Changing_Levels_of_Stalinist_Repression_in_the_1930s_Mass_Killing
s. 
102 CNN Staff, “Slaying of Hamas Leader in Dubai is International Murder Mystery,” CNN, 
March 23, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/02/16/dubai.hamas.killing/. 
103 Denis Eisenburg, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau, The Mossad Inside Stories: Israel’s Secret 
Intelligence Service (London: Paddington Press, 1978), 41.  
104 Ibid.  
105 Steve Coll, “Remote Control: Our Drone Delusion,” New Yorker, May 6, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/06/remote-control. 
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indirectly involved, brought to power pro-American dictator Joseph Mobutu, who 
pushed Congo into deep chaos that persists to date.106 
Because of this troubling record of covert operations, the policy of targeted 
killings for national interests was contested and extensively debated in Congress 
in the 1970s.107 A Congressional committee condemned such killings: “[W]e 
condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy.”108 
This committee and its work led to a change in policy, culminating in the 
Executive Order (EO) of President Gerald Ford—EO 11905 in 1976—which 
banned all kinds of political assassination.109 Successive presidents upheld the 
EO as assassinations undermined the rule of law, democracy, and human 
rights.110   
The post-Cold War environment brought asymmetric threats to the fore, 
and consequently the moral politics of targeted killing policy was replaced with 
realpolitische considerations—i.e., national interests trump all moral 
considerations. In 1993, an attack on the World Trade Center by Ramzi Yousaf 
and his cohorts prompted the signing of EO 12947 in 1995, which permitted the 
creation of a terrorist list by U.S. authorities. In 1998, the Clinton Administration, 
using Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, authorized the use of lethal 
force against Osama bin Laden and his associates. After the Twin Tower attacks 
on U.S. soil, a joint senate resolution on September 14, 2001—ultimately codified 
106 Tim Ripely, Air War Afghanistan: U.S. and NATO Air Operations from 2001 (Yorkshire, 
UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2011), 153; Coll, “Remote Control.”  
107 Elizabeth B. Bazan, Assassination Ban: Brief Summary (CRS Report No. RS21037) 
updated January 4, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21037.pdf.   
108 Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings: Law and 
Morality in Asymmetrical World (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34.  
109 Ibid., 34–35; History of Executive Orders (EO) to ban Assassinations – Jimmy Carter EO 
12306 in 1978, Ronald Reagan EO 12333 in 1981, Bill Clinton EO 12947 in 1995, and in 2001, 
Senate Joint Resolution 23 granted President George W. Bush to use all possible force against 
those involved in 9/11 attacks. 
110 Ibid. 
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as the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)111—granted President 
George W. Bush the power to use all “necessary and appropriate force,” against 
those involved directly or indirectly in 9/11 attacks.112 Since then, targeted killing 
became lawful in the U.S. legal system that authorized the offensive deployment 
of armed drones.  
B. THE DRONE ERA 
The evolution of drones happened in three stages. The first phase was 
from World War 1 to the 1950s, when drones were utilized as targets to train anti-
aircraft gunners and pilots. The second phase ranged from the 1960s to the 
1990s, when drones were transformed to a powerful aerial sensor, and mainly 
used for reconnaissance, employed against Vietnam and Cuba. The third and 
most important phase began in 2000 and continues today, when drones have 
been used as a weapon, and these flying platforms have become deadly 
weapons and are effectively used in the GWOT.113  
The Predator drone first came to light in 1994 when it was deployed for 
surveillance against the Serbs in the Balkans. In 1998, Osama bin Laden 
unleashed a reign of terror against American and Jewish interests, which 
included Israel and the Western countries that support it, by issuing a fatwa. This 
pronouncement prompted the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya, which, in turn, led to retaliation from the United States through Tomahawk 
cruise missiles in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden escaped the strikes but the 
search continued and led to discussion on targeted assassination. To this end, in 
1998, President Clinton in a Memorandum of Notification relaxed the 
111 Public Law 107–40, “Joint Resolution,” September 18, 2001, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. 
112 Gordon L. Bowen, “Targeted Killings: Timeline of U.S. Policy Concerning Covert 
Operations Involving Assassination,” Global Research, March 2013, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/targeted-killings-timeline-of-u-s-policy-concerning-covert-
operations-involving-assassination/5326095. 
113 Ian G. R. Shaw, “The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones,” 
Understanding Empire, 2013, http://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2-0-a-brief-history-of-u-
s-drones/. 
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assassination ban on the agencies that allowed the use of lethal force against 
U.S. enemies in Afghanistan.114 
Reaper, the advanced version of drones came to light in 2001 after the 
General Atomics, the manufacturer, developed a more lethal unmanned aerial 
platform with extra payload.115 During the same period the issue of targeted 
killings came under discussion in the U.S. Senate. On 9/11, when the United 
States was attacked and its security interests inside and abroad were threatened 
by al-Qaeda, the targeted killing policy changed overnight. In the same month, 
President George W. Bush signed a directive delegating blanket powers to the 
CIA for a targeted killing campaign against suspected terrorists of al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates.116 Cofer Black, who was the counterterrorism coordinator in the 
Bush Administration, best described this shift: “With the approval of the directive, 
the gloves come off.”117 From this point, the operation of targeted killings spread 
to Pakistan, Yemen, Philippines, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan.118  
The irony was that in July 2001, the United States denounced the targeted 
assassination policy of Israel and described it as extra-judicial killing. But in 
September, subsequent to the CIA security brief to the president about the Bin 
Laden impending mission of striking against the U.S. assets, a decision was 
made to activate the armed drone program. Consequently, after 9/11, the armed 
drone program was activated and the first batch of Predators reached 
Afghanistan on September 16, 2001, for reconnaissance against the HVTs, 
followed by the armed Predators that reached on October 7, 2001.119  
114 Shaw, “The Rise of the Predator Empire.” 
115 John Sifton, “A Brief History of Drones,” Nation, February 7, 2013, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones. 
116“Living Under Drones,” 24. 
117 Intelligence Resource Program, “Testimony to Cofer Black,” Federation of American 
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In 2002, at Zhawar kili in Afghanistan, the first drone strike took place 
killing three innocents who were collecting scrap. The operation had been 
conceived to hunt down bin Laden, and the targets were chosen because one of 
the suspects bore a resemblance to him.120 Initially, it was claimed that the strike 
was appropriate, and later on, while the administration acknowledged that the 
suspect was not Osama bin Laden, it insisted that the target was legitimate.121 In 
November of the same year, the targeted killing campaign was shifted to Yemen 
where a drone targeted a car carrying six suspected terrorists, killing all on the 
spot. Qaed Sinan was one of them, wanted by the United States for his 
involvement in the attack on the USS Cole in 2000.122  
Until 2002, there was no official record of any protest in Pakistan about the 
killings of innocent civilians through drone strikes and Tomahawks in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere in the world. In 1998, Pakistan did protest to the United States 
over the violation of its airspace and the killing of a few civilians through 
Tomahawks that landed on Pakistani soil; however, Pakistan retracted the latter 
part of the statement.123 The reason for retracting the earlier claim was that 
Pakistani forces recovered a few unexploded Tomahawks missiles from 
Baluchistan, which it denied to the United States resulting in a soured 
relationship.124     
These events of targeted killings set up the precedent for drone strikes in 
Pakistan. After 9/11, most of the al-Qaeda and its affiliate commanders crossed 
over to the tribal region of Pakistan. The United States had no choice but to 
target these terrorist elements seeking refuge in the hideouts in highly 
treacherous terrain, which is inaccessible and inhospitable. Boots on the ground 
120“Living Under Drones,” 24. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., 25.   
123 CNN Staff, “Pakistan Lodges Protest over U.S. Missile Strikes,” CNN, August 23, 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/21/air.strikes.02/. 
124 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), 248. 
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was not a favorable option, as evaluated by the United States for its international 
repercussions and severe blowback from the locals. From 2002 to 2004, drones 
were used for surveillance over these hideouts and safe havens in the tribal 
region of Pakistan. Eventually, in June 2004, the first drone strike took place in 
Pakistan targeting Nek Muhammad—Taliban Commander—who was a staunch 
supporter of al-Qaeda.125 
Complete mystery surrounded the first drone strike in Pakistan. Both the 
U.S. and Pakistan militaries claimed this successful strike. The United States 
claimed it for obvious reasons as it operated and controlled the drones, whereas 
Pakistan wanted to take the credit in order to blanket the tacit understanding with 
the administration and possible backlash over drone strikes.126 The drone strikes 
kept increasing with every passing year. During the Bush Administration from 
2004 to 2009, 45‒52 drone strikes were carried out in Pakistan sovereign 
territory.127 As President Obama assumed power, the strikes increased many 
times over, and within five years of his Administration (2009‒2014) the strikes 
increased up to 335 with an estimated 2,310‒3,743 killed.128 This unprecedented 
increase has resulted in “escalating tensions between the United States and 
Pakistan, as well as continued questions about the efficacy and accuracy of such 
strikes.”129 If at all Pakistan has consented discreetly to drone strikes in the past, 
it was restricted to certain conditions, which the ex- president of Pakistan 
125 Ibid. 
126“Charting Drone Strikes: In Sigh, In Mind,” Economist Blog, March 25, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/03/charting-drone-strikes. 
127 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010,” New America Foundation, February 24, 2010, mentioned 
in Joint Study Report “Living under Drones,” 26, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/
the_year_of_the_drone. 
128 Jack Serle, “Only 4% of Drone Victims in Pakistan Named as al Qaeda Members,” 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, October 16, 2014, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
category/projects/drones/. 
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revealed in 2013 saying as “only on a few occasions, when a target was 
absolutely isolated and [there was] no chance of collateral damage.”130  
In 2009, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Yousaf Raza Gillani asked for 
drone technology “to avoid the public outcry that regularly follows attacks by U.S. 
unmanned aircraft.”131 Pakistan’s policy dilemma came to light: whether to 
condemn the drone strike or the one who is behind the drone strike. Pakistan 
chose to oscillate between both, but would stress more on the latter due to 
common perception that “Pakistan is fighting [America’s] some else’s war,”132 
and consequently asked for the transfer of drone technology.  
C. REASONS FOR DRONE STRIKES INSIDE PAKISTAN 
The resumption—the third time in history—and subsequent fluctuation in 
U.S.-Pakistan relations after 9/11 provide a better understanding of drone strikes 
inside Pakistan. After 9/11, the United States nominated Pakistan as its frontline 
ally in GWOT, much to the shock of India, in particular, and other states in 
general. However, the hidden cost was not perceived; Pakistan never expected 
that it had to deliver more than required with a heavy strategic cost. The terrorists 
who took refuge in FATA after fleeing Afghanistan had to be flushed out; 
moreover, a full-scale operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network 
was one of the specific demands by the United States.133  
Initially, the U.S. administration was satisfied with Pakistan’s cooperation 
in the GWOT due to meaningful intelligence sharing between the CIA and ISI. 
130 John Boone and Peter Beaumont, “Pervez Musharraf Admits Permitting ‘a few’ U.S. 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” Guardian, April 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/
12/musharraf-admits-permitting-drone-strikes. 
131 Joshua Partlow, “Pakistan’s Gillani Asks U.S. for Drone Technology, Other Military Aid,” 
Washington Post, July 23, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2009/07/
22/AR2009072202224.html. 
132 Asad Munir, “Whose War Are We Fighting? Express Tribune with International New York 
Times, November 26, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/636909/whose-war-are-we-fighting/; Ayaz 
Amir, “Fighting Someone else’s War,” Dawn, August 17, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/news/
1073347. 
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Many HVTs of al-Qaeda were either apprehended or neutralized by combined 
operations. To this end, then U.S. President George Bush acknowledged the 
effort in the following words, “[thanks] to the effective border security measures 
and law enforcement cooperation throughout [Pakistan], and ... to the leadership 
of President Pervez Musharraf.”134 However, the opinion changed after almost 
four years as a result of al-Qaeda’s rise in operation capacity in FATA. According 
to the U.S. assessment “al-Qaeda has protected or regenerated key elements of 
its homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top 
leadership.”135 
The change in opinion toward Pakistan did not occur due to competing 
interests only but the overall emerging scenario during that time. All the 
developments in the region had a profound linkage to the insecurities of 
Pakistan. Indian influence in Afghanistan, the past relationship between the 
Taliban and the spy agency-ISI during the Afghan War of 1979, and finally the 
lack of capacity to launch a full-scale operation at a time when almost 120,000 
troops were fighting and deployed in FATA. Launching an operation would entail 
social problems in the form of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and the ensuing repercussions in the form of a reprisal and support for 
terrorism.136 
The United States had its own priorities in fighting the GWOT, in which 
Pakistan inaction against the terrorists in FATA was a big void. The U.S. belief 
narrowed down to the fact that either Pakistan was unable or unwilling to take 
action against the militants’ safe havens in FATA.137 On the other hand, the 
134 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflict, Goals, Compromised 
Performance,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_pakistan_final.pdf. 
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136 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA – A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy 
and Terror in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2009, 14–17.  
137 Ibid., 15. 
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dilemma for Pakistan was complicated, which the United States could not 
comprehend. The creation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007—the 
sworn enemies of the Pakistan military—were on a rampage before they seized 
Swat, a city perilously close to the capital of Pakistan.138 It changed the priorities 
of Pakistan armed forces in the GWOT, and Swat became the focal point of the 
counterterrorism operation.139 For its own compelling reason, Pakistan remained 
consistently unwilling to flush out the terrorists, especially of Haqqani network, 
which frustrated the United States and led to the drone strikes.140 The New York 
Times has quoted one of Pakistan’s Army generals putting across Pakistan’s 
perspective: 
Pakistan has done some serious fighting in terrorist strongholds 
and shed a lot of blood. Over the past two years forces have been 
enlarged to 147,000 soldiers, mainly by relocating more than 
50,000 from the Indian border. They have largely controlled militant 
activities in the Swat Valley, for example, which entailed two hard 
offensives with major casualties. But they have steadfastly declined 
to mount a major assault against North Waziristan—a mountainous 
region of terrorist deadwoods populated by battle-toughened 
outlaws.141 
The target selection choice was yet another point of the drone controversy 
between the United States and Pakistan that continues to date.142  Another issue 
is in regard to sealing off the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It 
requires huge resources and efforts to seal the border of almost 1400 miles 
138 Justine Fleischner, “Governance and Militancy in Swat Valley,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, October 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/
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meandering across the most treacherous terrain in the world.143 It is easier said 
than done to seal a border. For example, despite technology and resources, the 
United States is unable to stem the flow of illegal immigrants across the Mexican 
border.144 Making FATA the core issue by the U.S. in affecting the overall 
success of GWOT is a claim—unfounded—that can only be judged by time.145 
Finally, the issue of Pakistan’s agreements with the terrorists from time to time 
does not sit well with the U.S. administration. The United States wanted 
elimination of all terrorists who were on its hit list; however, Pakistan would go 
into agreement with some of them.146 None of the agreements has lasted for 
long—six months at most—due to the absence of an enforcement mechanism, 
but Pakistan would do it for its operational convenience as it did in Swat.147 The 
difference in operational priorities, coupled with the United States’ exaggerated 
demands vis-à-vis Pakistan’s limitations in GWOT, has affected the relationship 
between the two allies. The lack of mutual trust led to the unilateral drone strikes 
in FATA and surgical strike, as in the case of Osama bin Laden.148  
To conclude, targeted killing and assassination have different 
connotations in international law. Assassination violates international law and is 
against U.S. domestic law as enforced through the 1976 executive order. 
Moreover, targeted killings, carried out against irregular combatants as 
determined by legal, accountable, and open process “is acceptable under the 
143 Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Durand Line: Tribal Politics and Pakistan- Afghanistan 
Relations,” in the Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency, ed. Thomas Johnson and Barry Scott 
Zellen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
144 “Illegal Immigration from Mexico,” U.S. Immigration Support, 
http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/illegal-immigration-from-mexico.html. 
145 U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Safe Havens – 5.1.a – 5.1.b Strategies, Tactics, and 
Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens, July 31, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
2011/195549.htm; Lisa Curtis, “Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan,” Heritage Foundation, 
October 26, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/10/denying-terrorists-safe-
haven-in-pakistan. 
146 Fleischner “Governance and Militancy in Swat Valley.” 
147 Fleischner, “Governance and Militancy in Swat Valley; Seth Jones and Christine Fair, 
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2010), 34.  
148 CNN Staff, “How U.S. Forces Killed Osama bin Laden,” CNN World- U.S. Edition, May 3 , 
2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.rai. 
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international law governing warfare.”149 Mainly after 9/11, the CIA has shifted its 
focus to targeted killings in Pakistan to eliminate the terrorists hiding in its tribal 
areas.150 This issue has serious repercussions in international politics, 
notwithstanding the ambivalent stance of Pakistan over drone operations.   
149 Steven R. Davis, “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 111, https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/
targetedkilling/papers/DavidIsraelPolicy.pdf. 
150 Greg Miller and Julie Tate, “CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets,” Washington Post, 
September 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-shifts-focus-to-
killing-targets/2011/08/30/gIQA7MZGvJ_story.html. 
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III. THE DRONE STRIKES: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
After 9/11, the cooperation between the United States and Pakistan 
helped in the capture and elimination of terrorist elements; however, the common 
interests in the GWOT have been overshadowed by the divergence on how to 
tackle this scourge.151 Drone strikes inside Pakistan’s sovereign territory—
specifically FATA—and the surgical strike against Osama bin Laden in the 
garrison city of Abbottabad, remain controversial, and inspire severe local 
opposition.152 The United States, on the other hand, considers drones as an 
effective instrument against terrorism.153  
It is increasingly alone in this estimation. Opposition to the drone strikes is 
not limited to Pakistan. In a recent survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Centre, 31 out of 39 countries oppose U.S. drone strikes.154 Even within the 
United States, doubts have been raised over its legality and judicial 
accountability.155  
151 Maria Syed, “Drone Strikes: Developing an Accord,” News International, November 13, 
2013, http://www.ipripk.org/drone-strikes-developing-an-accord/#sthash.S1zO5Kc5.dpuf. 
152 Air Commodore Khalid Iqbal, “Drones under UN Scrutiny,” Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute, December 27, 2013, http://ipripak.org/articles/latest/duus.pdf. Earlier it was presumed 
that the authorities in Pakistan had given tacit approval to drone strikes, but of late, Pakistan has 
shed its ambiguous stance, and has opposed these strikes at every forum.  
153 James Igoe Walsh, “The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and 
Counterterrorism Campaign,” Strategic Studies Institute, September 2013, 9, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1167.pdf. 
154 Bruce Drake, “Report Questions Drone Use, Widely Unpopular Globally, But Not in the 
U.S.,” PEW Research Center, October 23, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/
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A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: SELF-DEFENSE  
The use of preemptive force in self-defense is not a new phenomenon; it 
took root in the customary international law156 that existed long before the 
adoption of the UN Charter.157 The famous Caroline affair158—a diplomatic 
incident between the United States and Britain in 1837—laid the foundation of 
customary rules for (and subsequent efforts to codify) national for self-
defense.159 The Case takes its name from a steam ship, the Caroline, which the 
British charged was used by Americans to aid an anti-crown insurgency in 
Canada. (In the event, the Canadian rebels had declared an independent 
Republic of Canada while they hid on an island in Lake Ontario. The Caroline 
brought supplies and money while the insurgents regrouped.) British and loyal 
Canadian forces raided the ship one night as it was docked in American water. 
The crew was chased off the vessel—though one American was killed on the 
dock as the party boarded—and the Caroline was set on fire. A Royal Navy ship 
then towed the Caroline into the current and let the flaming wreckage drift over 
Niagara Falls. The American public, roused by the lurid and exaggerated 
newspaper reports, was outraged. The United States initiated a diplomatic 
exchange with London, demanding apologies and compensation, but the British 
took a stance of (self-) defense of Canada.160 
156 Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established 
state practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international treaties. 
Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states that they 
follow from a sense of legal obligation; Law Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
customary_international_law. 
157 Arend, “International Law,” 90. 
158 Hunter Miller, “British-American Diplomacy the Caroline Case,” Lillian Goldman Law 
Library of Yale Law School, 2008, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp; John E. 
Noyes, “The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force,” in International Law Stories, 
eds. John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson, and Mark W. Janis (New York: Thomson West, 2007), 
263–270. 
159 Colonel Steven L. Kenney, “The National Security Strategy Under the United Nations and 
International law,” USAWC Strategy Research Project, March 19, 2004, 7, http://www.dtic.mil/get-
tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA423785. 
160 Noyes, “The Caroline,” 263–70. 
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The Caroline case can be correlated to the drone issue. The American 
supporters of the Canadian insurgency acted like “Good Taliban” because they 
were creating problems for the British Empire by supporting and harboring the 
Canadian insurgents. The British acted in self-defense by attacking the Caroline 
in U.S. territorial waters, much like the present-day drone strikes in Pakistan.  
In the Caroline case, the United States argued that even if the Canadian 
rebels were supported by the United States, the violators should have been 
tried—national law—by the U.S. courts. Moreover, an attack on a neutral country 
for self-defense must not be permitted under ordinary circumstances like routine 
defense, retaliation, and convenience. The British regretted overstepping into the 
U.S. territory, but argued that the destruction of the Caroline was necessary 
because the United States was fomenting insurgency in Canada and certainly 
aiding the enemy. Moreover, the British also suspected that the United States 
would have been unable to take action against the rebels.161  
The U.S. view prevailed and the Caroline incident, in fact, completely 
transformed the right of self-defense from a “political excuse to legal doctrine.”162 
It also established some strict criteria for the claim: a state can exercise the right 
of self-defense only if the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, 
and leaving no choice of means and no moments for deliberation.”163 Otherwise, 
the sovereignty of the third state is deemed to be sacrosanct. The convenience 
of preemptive action was not accepted as suitable reason to intrude on it.   
1. Necessity, Immediacy, and Proportionality  
From the Caroline case, three fundamental factors set the criteria for self-
defense: necessity, immediacy—commonly referred to as imminence—and 
161 Ibid. 
162 R. Y. Jennings, “The Caroline and McLeod Cases,” American Journal of International 
Law 32, no.1 (January 1938): 82, JSTORE (21105096705933) http://www.jstor.org/discover/
10.2307/
2190632?uid=3739560&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21105096705933. 
163 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspective on International Law, 5th ed. (United 
States: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 458. 
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proportionality.164 Necessity is the first prerequisite for using force in self-
defense. In simple words, a state should establish that “the use of force by the 
other state was imminent, and that there was essentially nothing but forcible 
action that would forestall such attack.”165 Moreover, “[n]ecessity can only be met 
when alternative peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been 
exhausted.”166 All other reasonable measures must be taken before the 
necessity requirement is fulfilled. 
Immediacy is the second requirement, which is closely linked to necessity. 
The immediacy of the threat should be fairly demonstrated so that the action in 
self-defense becomes a necessity. By the language of the Caroline exchange, 
the triggering act must pose an urgent threat, leaving no other recourse. By the 
same token, the longer a government has to reflect on or plan a response, the 
less immediate the threat becomes.167  
Proportionality is the third requirement: the threat and the use of force 
should be proportional to each other. In simple words, “exercise of anticipatory 
self-defense should be proportional to the provocation.”168 Response by the 
attacker should be proportional to the losses suffered; moreover, the force 
employed should not be excessively disproportionate to achieve the objective.169 
In present times, out of these three key variables, application of proportionality is 
more complicated than necessity because the latter can be determined with 
relative ease in the decision-making process.170  
164 Louis-Philippe Rouillard, “The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defense in Contemporary 
International Law,” Miskolc Journal of International law, 1, no. 2 (2004): 104–120, http://www.uni-
miskolc.hu/~wwwdrint/20042rouillard1.htm. 
165 Rouillard, “The Caroline Case,” 107. 
166Sikander Ahmed Shah, “War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and the Legality of Drone Strikes inside Pakistan,” Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 9, no. 1 (2010): 93, http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=globalstudies. 
167 Rouillard, “The Caroline Case.”  
168 Ibid., 109. 
169 Shah, “War on Terrorism,” 93. 
170 Slomanson, International law, 458; Shah, “War on Terrorism,” 93. 
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The right—or the claim—of self-defense has been used and misused 
many times since the Caroline affair; sometimes lawfully, mostly as an excuse for 
aggressive action like in the invasion of Denmark and Norway during the Second 
World War.171 Denmark and Norway both declared their neutrality in the war, 
through a non-aggression pact; however, Denmark was invaded by Germany for 
military necessity.172 As regards the invasion of Norway, the Germans claimed 
they acted in self-defense—secured bases—for fear of the landing of British and 
French expeditionary forces, which was in violation of Norway’s neutrality and 
could have affected German war plans. Both the justifications were rejected by 
the tribunal investigating the case.173     
Another important factor related to self-defense is state responsibility, and 
the Corfu channel case (1949) is a case in point. In October 1944, in Albanian 
territorial waters, two British destroyers, H.M.S Saumarez and H.M.S Volage, hit 
mines that resulted in the loss of lives and damage to the ships. The British 
charged the Albanian government of either laying the mine or knowing about the 
presence of mines, but failing to inform the British of the danger, which is against 
international law.174 The Albanian government contested both charges, but the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) states that “[its] every state’s responsibility not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
states.”175 This suggests that a state territory cannot be used for unlawful acts—
such as harboring terrorists—against another state.  
171 Rouillard, “The Caroline Case,” 110. 
172 Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression (New York: United Nations 
Publications, 2003), 107–109, http://www.un.org/law/books/HistoricalReview-Aggression.pdf. 
173 Ibid.  
174 International Court of Justice, “Cases: Corfu Channel (UK of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v. Albania),”12–14, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=1&p3=4. 
175 Ibid.   
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2. Redefining Imminent Threat  
In international law, imminent threat became the standard criterion, after 
the Caroline affair. The diplomatic exchange between the United States and 
Britain defined an imminent threat as: “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment of deliberations.”176 In the original conception, 
imminent threat was related to certain visible, provocative acts like mobilization of 
troops and equipment or massing of forces on a state border. The assumption 
was that such a menace would be perpetrated by one sovereign state against 
another and that the evidence of this violent intention would be visible and 
physical.177 The prospect of an immediate attack also justifies the use of 
preemptive force in self-defense without a state first having to withstand the 
attack. Particularly once the nuclear age dawned, the notion of a pre-emptive 
strike was generally accepted though not clearly defined.178  
In the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), prevention features 
prominently; indeed, two of the eight broad themes or ambitions that structure 
this document include “prevent” in their programmatic titles.179 In both cases, this 
prevention refers specifically to the terrorist threat, which the strategy identifies 
as emanating from “[t]housands of trained terrorists … with cells in North 
America, South American, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.”180 
In the name of prevention, the NSS document promulgates what has since 
become known as the Bush Doctrine: “While the United States will constantly 
strive to enlist support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act 
alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively 
176 Rouillard, “The Caroline Case.” 
177 Ben Fritz, “Sorting out the ‘Imminent Threat’ Debate,” Spin Sanity, November 3, 2003, 
http://www.spinsanity.org/columns/20031103.html; Dan Darling, “Special Analysis: The Imminent 
Threat,” Winds of Change, September 4, 2003, http://windsofchange.net/archives/003991.html.  
178 Arend, “International Law,” 90. 
179 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2002 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2002), 1‒2, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, and http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
nsc/nss/2002/. 
180 Ibid., 5. 
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against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and 
our country.”181  
The 2010 NSS does not include the word “preempt” in any form. It invokes 
prevention in connection with deterrence, which is a rather more conventional 
understanding of how armed prevention should work under the law.182 With the 
change of administration came a rethinking of the ambitious aspects of the Bush 
Doctrine, which shows that even the United States came to be a little 
uncomfortable with the full program of preemption. Drone strikes are a modality 
of the heyday of the Bush Doctrine, but they do not seem to have been rethought 
quite so extensively.183 
3. The Effect of the UN Charter  
In present times even in the presence of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the 
Caroline affair is often cited in disputes that revolve around pre-emptive strikes 
because Article 51of the UN Charter is not explicitly clear on the question of 
when the right of self-defense begins.184 Article 51 states that, “the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security,”185 posits a strong 
condition—armed attack—before a state can act in self-defense. In contrast, the 
181 Ibid., 6. 
182 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2010 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default /files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
183 Ibid.  
184 Article 51 states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as 
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Mentioned in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Actions with Respect to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts 
of Aggression, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. 
185 Rouillard, “The Caroline Case,” 110–11. 
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Caroline case does not place a threshold of an armed attack on a state prior to 
acting in self-defense.  
In its outline, Article 51 provides a clear direction, but it also reflects a 
slight deviation from the customary right of anticipatory self-defense. The 
deviation relates to the clarity, in broad and narrow interpretation, of “determining 
the scope of the right to use force in self-defense” by customary international law 
and the UN Charter, respectively. The deviation has divided the experts into two 
groups. The first group, the so-called restrictionists, claims that, “the intent of 
Article 51 was explicitly to limit the use of force in self-defense to those situations 
in which an armed attack has actually occurred.” This view would suggest that a 
likely victim is helpless by law to act in self-defense unless and until it is attacked 
first; thus, preemptive actions are unlawful.186  
The second group—”counter-restrictionists”—of scholars, however, rejects 
this narrow interpretation. According to them, the reference to the “inherent right” 
in Article 51 reflects a continuation rather than a limitation of the pre-existing 
customary international law on anticipatory self-defense. The requirement of an 
armed attack is one of the circumstances—not the only circumstance—in which 
self-defense becomes permissible.187 The Bush Doctrine clearly subscribes to 
the counter-restrictionist viewpoint and, in fact, pushes it even further to the issue 
of harboring non-state actors.  
The fundamental issue in international law is between the right of self-
defense and the right to anticipatory self-defense, which rejects the requirements 
of immediacy. Both are recognized, but the latter has issues with interpretation. 
Either way, the UN Charter explicitly states that the use of force is limited to two 
instances: Individual and collective self-defense after an armed attack has 
occurred under Article 51, and in the restoration of peace and security through 
186 Arend, “International Law,” 92; Kenney, “The National Security Strategy,” 5; Corinne 
Lewis, “Don’t Stop Now: The Development of the International Law, Right to use Force in Self-




                                            
collective measures under Article 42. However, a few states, by claiming to 
remain within their right of self-defense, still resort to anticipatory self-defense in 
order to prevent an armed attack.188 
B. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
In aftermath of the 9/11 incident, then-President George W. Bush 
declared: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed 
these acts and those who harbor them.”189 This statement became part of the 
foundation of the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine consists of four prongs: 1) 
“Take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again here at 
home”; 2) “Confront threats before they fully materialize”; 3) “Advance liberty and 
hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear”; and 4) 
“Make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them, and 
hold both to account.”190 The policy provided the legal basis for preemptive 
strikes, in Afghanistan, and tribal areas of Pakistan.  
Endorsing the Bush Doctrine, the Obama Administration in a Department 
of Justice White Paper, states: “The condition that operational leaders present an 
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the 
United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and 
interests will take place in the immediate future.”191 Accordingly, the present 
administration still uses drones to kill suspected terrorists on foreign soil “who 
pose a continuing, and imminent threat to the American people.”192 The only 
188 Rouillard, “The Caroline Case,” 114. 
189 Frontline Staff, “The Evolution of the Bush doctrine,” Frontline, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html. 
190 Washington Post Staff, “Decision Points, by Pres. George W. Bush: on Foreign Policy,” 
Washington Post, December 21, 2006, http://www.ontheissues.org/Archive/
Decision_Points_Foreign_Policy.htm. 
191 “Department of Justice White Paper,” NBC News,  http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 




                                            
change is handing over the baton from CIA to the U.S. Department of Defence 
(DOD).  
The Obama Administration argues that Pakistan has important (if not 
dispositive) links with the non-state actors, even if there is no evidence of 
authorization of operation to the non-state actors.193 The Administration further 
insists that the cross-border attacks on its forces, with complicity of ISI, are 
committed by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which have safe havens in Pakistani 
territory.194 
1. Preemption and Prevention: The Bush Doctrine 
The 2002 NSS is often cited as the definitive statement of the Bush 
Doctrine, which has evolved significantly.195 It initially focused on deterrence, 
followed by the policy of containment, and finally arrived at first strike against 
rogue states and terrorists.196 It contends that “[t]he greater the threat, the 
greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy’s attack.”197 The strategy focuses on predicting the future 
intentions of states and non-state actors—unilaterally—making it convenient for 
the use of force.198  
The 2002 NSS argued that the concept of imminent threat should be 
redefined after the 9/11 incident so as to afford more flexibility in acting to 
prevent a potential and cataclysmic threat, particularly one authored by rogue 
193“Living Under Drones,” 112. 
194 Ahmed Bilal Soofi, “Does International Law Permit U.S. Strikes inside Pakistan?” News 
International, October 7, 2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/OpinionWriters.aspx?ID=a. 
195 New York Times Staff, “Aftermath; the Bush Doctrine,” New York Times, April 13, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/opinion/aftermath-the-bush-doctrine.html. 
196 Chris J. Dolan, “The Bush Doctrine and U.S. Intervention,” Foreign Services Dispatches 
and Periodic Reports on the U.S. Diplomacy, June 2004, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/
archives_roll/2004_04-06/dolan_bush/dolan_bush.html. 
197 Arend, “International Law,” 96–98. 
198 Dolan, “The Bush Doctrine.” 
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states or non-state actors. Pre-emption gave way to prevention in this document, 
which came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The modified concept was meant 
to offset the limitations imposed by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which are 
occurrence of an armed attack followed by approval of the Security Council for 
any action. Moreover, the procedural requirements of Article 51, which required 
going through the Security Council for adopting certain measures before use of 
force in self-defense, were considered an inconvenience by the administration 
and dodged conveniently.199 
The distinctive feature of the Bush Doctrine is its relaxation of the vital 
factor of necessity while using force against potential threats. The 2002 NSS 
specifically adhered to the concept of imminent threat by stating: “We must adapt 
the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries.” In other words, the administration interpreted the law in a way that 
does not require the element of necessity, as it makes no sense with the new 
form of enemy, the terrorist. It may be too late for a response, if the threat is 
recognized through the imminent qualification.200 
International law scholars disagree. Arend states: “Although traditional 
international law would not require certainty regarding time and place, it would 
suggest near certainty. If an attack is imminent, it is almost certain that the attack 
will occur,” suggesting that the Bush Doctrine, as some scholars say, is not in 
consonance with international law.201 
There is a problem in balancing between imminent threat and preemptive 
strike. The presence of al-Qaeda, with a historical record of attacks against the 
United States does give leverage in establishing imminence. The terrorists can 
strike U.S. interests anywhere and at any time. However, according to Bush 
199 The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002; Fritz, “Imminent Threat,” 
Darling, “Special Analysis.” 
200 The National Security Strategy, September 2002; Archives, “Prevent Our Enemies from 
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” U.S. 
Department of State, 2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html. 
201 Arend, “International Law,” 96–97. 
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Doctrine, “America is not going to wait until the last minute before acting, but 
rather would neutralize threats well before they became imminent.” The United 
States follows the standard self-defense rules against any threat in order to 
preempt rather than to prevent and contain.202  
The United States has used preemptive force without UN authorization, 
including air strikes against Libya and missile strikes against El-Shifa chemical 
plants in Sudan, mistakenly targeted as a weapons factory, which were illegal 
under International law. The problem is aggravated when a group is likely to 
attack but has not committed an action. In such a scenario when would a state 
lawfully go for preemption? Here is the blurred boundary line, which has yet to 
address the use of force preemptively in self-defense against terrorism.203 
2. U.S. Domestic Law  
U.S. domestic law must allow drone strikes on foreign soil. The president 
wields significant authority on the use of force through Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution.204 Moreover, a joint resolution—the AUMF—passed shortly after 
the 9/11terror attacks,205 authorizes the president, as commander-in-chief, “to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
202 Dore Gold, “U.S. Policy on Preventive Military Action against Iran,” Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (March 2012), http://jcpa.org/article/u-s-policy-on-preventive-military-
action-against-iran/; Arend, “International Law, 98–99. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Richard F. Grimmett, Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 
Attacks (P.L. 107–40): Legislative History (CRS Report No 22357) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2007), 3‒5, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf. 
205“Living Under Drones,” 118–19. 
 48 
                                            
persons.”206 The White House argues that the AMUF, backed by the U.S. 
Constitution justifies drone strikes on foreign soil.207  
U.S. officials argue that the fight in the GWOT is not against al Qaeda, but 
all the affiliated groups that support them—associated forces—all over the world, 
whenever they become known.208 This language used in the AMUF suggests 
that legally the United States can strike against Al Qaeda, and its affiliates like 
the Taliban who unleashed their reign of terror against U.S. interests and 
personnel. The World Trade Center attack in 1993, suicide bombing of the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Nairobi in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole 
in 2000, and the 9/11 attacks are among the most notable.209 However, the 
Pakistani Taliban and Haqqani network are not the associated forces because 
they are not involved in any of these attacks. Still, they are targeted by drone 
strikes, which arguably is not fair under the AUMF.210  
The AUMF has no time limit and provides the legal authority for executives 
to misuse power by killing, kidnapping, and torturing. According to Barbara Lee, a 
congresswoman, the AUMF is “a blank check for endless war … that gives any 
president the nearly unlimited authority to wage limitless war at anytime, 
anywhere, for any reason, in perpetuity,” and suggests that the unlimited and 
206 Authorization of Use of Military Force, Pub.L.No. 107–40, & 2(a), 115 stat. 224, 224 
(September 18, 2001) (reported as a note to 50 U.S.C.A & 1541). Emphasis added. 
207 The White Paper cites the concurrence by Justice Jackson in the seminal Youngtown 
Sheet & Tube case, which posits that the president acts as the “zenith” of this power when he 
acts in accordance with a congressional grant of authority, in this case, the AMUF. Youngtown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
208 Jeh C. Johnson, on “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama 
Administration,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2012, at Yale law School, 
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unchecked power needs congressional oversight, which so far has not been 
done.211  
Once al-Qaeda is degraded, and the United States reaches a tipping 
point, responsibility would pass from the military to other law enforcement 
agencies.212 The authorities vested in the president by the AUMF through 
Congress will no longer be applicable to justify the use of force. Jeh Johnson, 
then senior lawyer in the Obama Administration, and presently U.S. Secretary of 
Homeland Security, has said that the United States “will not be able to say ... that 
our efforts should no longer be considered an armed conflict against al-Qaida 
and its affiliates.”213 No one knows how and when it would happen; 
notwithstanding the oft-repeated U.S. claims that al-Qaeda has been made 
ineffective.214 
Another related issue is the involvement of the CIA in drone operations 
inside Pakistan. Whether the CIA can operate beyond the parameters of 
congressional authority is still debatable; however, with the AUMF in place, the 
“President has the authority to issue findings to authorize CIA action beyond the 
parameters of Congressional authorization as long as such action does not 
otherwise violate domestic law.”215 The United States should provide legal basis 
for such actions because “individual strikes could constitute acts of illegal extra 
judicial assassination, and assassinations have long been condemned in the 
US.”216 However, according to the white paper issued by the Department of 
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Justice, “[a] lawful killing in self defense is not an assassination,” as it would not 
violate the assassination ban.217 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE 
Pakistan has neither the capacity nor the intention to attack the United 
States directly or indirectly. Pakistan certainly is not at war with the United 
States. Thus, by the standards of international law, the United States has no right 
to carry out drone and surgical strikes inside Pakistan—each a violation of its 
territorial integrity.  
Relying on established International law, Pakistan raises several issues: 
violation of its territorial integrity; the question of jus ad bellum; the lawful and 
unlawful targeting of individuals (collateral damage).218 
1. State Support to Non-state Actors 
The ICJ has articulated the laws—in different cases—that help clarify the 
drone issue. These cases are Nicaragua vs. U.S. (1986), the Tadic Judgment 
(1996), and Uganda vs. Congo (2005). These three cases define different 
aspects of state support, broadly defined to non-state actors.219 
In the first case, the United States justified its attack as collective self-
defense against Nicaragua for its alleged support of the insurgents in El 
Salvador. Despite the fact that evidence of ‘state support’ was found, the ICJ 
ruled in favor of Nicaragua for the reason that the sabotage acts are independent 
and individual, which cannot be attributed to Nicaragua as the supporting 
state.220 The judgment states that the evidence in extension of support to 
insurgents does not provide sufficient grounds for an armed attack against 
217 “Department of Justice White Paper,” 15.  
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Nicaragua.221 The ICJ held that “for a state to be responsible for the activities of 
contras [non-state actors], it would have to be proved that state had effective 
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed.”222 Likewise, in the drone case, the United States, 
without establishing that the terror acts of the Haqqani network in Afghanistan 
are clearly attributed to Pakistan, it is unlawful to carry out an armed attack in the 
form of drone strikes. Pakistan can be blamed for “state tolerance” of the Taliban, 
but the issue of “effective control,” as stated in the Nicaragua case, cannot be 
made with certainty. 
The second case is the Prosecutor vs. Tadic case. Dusko Tadic was a 
Bosnian Serb, a paramilitary official who committed extreme crimes against 
humanity at Prejidor and detention camps in Bosnia. The tribunal declared that 
his criminal acts were “acts of de facto state organs regardless of any specific 
instruction by the state,” as the court focused on the “subordination of the group 
to the overall control of the state.”223 The court held that “to be a de facto organ 
of the state, overall control over such outfit would suffice.”224 Pakistan does not 
have “overall control” of the Haqqani and Taliban network, which is also 
corroborated by the statements made no less than by U.S. President Obama, 
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Admiral Mike Mullen. Although the 
United States has evidence of Pakistan’s “contacts” with Taliban—which other 
states have as well, there is no evidence of “authorization or approval” of any 
unlawful action by the Pakistan government.225 
The third case relates to the Ugandan attack on Congo. On the pretext 
that rebels based in Congo were responsible for carrying out attacks in Uganda, 
the Ugandan government launched an armed attack against the rebels inside the 
221 Soofi, “Does International Law Permit?” 
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sovereign territory of Congo. The ICJ determined that a state cannot carry out an 
armed attack in self-defense against non-state actors by violating the territorial 
integrity of another state. Moreover, there is no evidence that the state—
Congo—sponsored the attack from its land.226  
These three cases highlight two important factors: maintaining contacts 
with non-state actors and nationality. In the Nicaragua and Congo cases, 
“maintaining contacts” does not come within the realm of state responsibility, so 
the United States, making this precedent the basis for using force in self-defense 
is unlawful. Moreover, nationality cannot be made the basis of state 
responsibility—international law—unless the unlawful acts of that particular 
national points to the state itself as in the Tadic case. On the contrary, Taliban 
are neither the agent nor affiliated with Pakistan Government. By this analogy the 
U.S. drone strikes in self-defense are hard to explain by international law.227   
Two exceptions in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter are relevant in the 
present scenario that provides a legal cover for the drone strikes. First, “when the 
use of force is carried out with the consent of host state,” and, second, the use of 
force is allowed “where the host state is unwilling or unable to take appropriate 
action.” As regards the first point, some analysts suspect that Pakistani 
authorities had tacitly supported the drone strikes. However, repeated public 
statements by the government officials about the illegality of the U.S. drone 
strikes cast doubt on the issue of consent notwithstanding the political 
expediency involved in it. As regards the second point, Pakistan has a mixed 
record of response. At times, leaders have turned a blind eye to violent non-state 
actors, but at times took out HVTs like Khalid Sheikh Muhammad.228  
The caveats in international law of “state consent and unwillingness” do 
not rise to the level of state support for non-state actors as brought out in the 
226 Ibid. 
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228“Living Under Drones,” 133.  
 53 
                                            
related three cases decided by the ICJ. However, they provide sufficient legal 
cover to the drone strikes. 
2. Collateral Damage and Targeted Killings: A Dilemma   
Drones rely on intelligence, which at times can be flawed. Consequently, 
drone strikes have resulted in much higher numbers of civilian casualties than 
the militants. Targeted killings within the context of an armed conflict or outside 
armed conflict have legal implications. Due to the involvement of non-state 
actors, the United States claims it as a non–international armed conflict governed 
by IHL, without meeting the legal criteria.229 Interestingly, in the absence of an 
armed conflict, only IHRL applies. Targeted killings are not lawful under IHRL 
because during armed conflict, IHL (commonly known as the law of war) 
supersedes it.230  
IHRL is found in the UN Basic Principles on the use of force and firearms, 
which states that “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when 
strictly unavoidable in order to protect life,” giving legal cover to the use of 
firearms only in self-defense. Under these restrictions “individuals cannot be 
targeted for lethal attack merely because of past unlawful behavior, but only for 
imminent or other grave threats to life when arrest is not a reasonable 
possibility.”231 In Pakistan, the drone strikes are contested because “they are 
unnecessary, as other, peaceful means of facing the threat have not been 
exhausted given the time parameters involved.”232 
229 Both IHL and IHRL strive to protect the lives, health and dignity of individuals, albeit from 
a different angle. International Humanitarian law (IHL) aims to protect people who do not or are 
no longer taking part in hostilities. The rules embodied in IHL impose duties on all parties to a 
conflict. International Human rights law (IHRL), being tailored primarily for peacetime, apply to 
everyone. Their principal goal is to protect individuals from arbitrary behavior by their own 
governments. IHRL does not deal with the conduct of hostilities. ICRC Resource Center, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5kzmuy.htm. 
230 Human Right Watch Staff, “Q&A: U.S. Targeted Killings and International Law,” Human 
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If there is an armed conflict—which the United States claims to be a non-
international armed conflict—then the drone strikes are evaluated in accordance 
with IHL. The U.S. administration has argued that targeted killings are justified as 
a self-defense measure; the application of IHL is adhered to in principle, which 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis under varying circumstances. 
However, the definition of associated forces and the legal points are not clarified 
by the U.S. administration, undermining the International legal framework.233  
The killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen of Yemen descent, in 
September 2011, is a case in point. He was never charged with any crime, but 
the U.S. administration claimed that he was al-Qaeda’s international 
propagandist and operation planner.234 Being a propagandist is not a valid 
charge, but being an operation planner qualifies Awlaki as a military target only if 
he was implicated in the past with the same charge.235 The rationale behind the 
attack is still not clear. The application of IHL dictates the legality of drone strikes 
through the principles of distinction and proportionality.236 
The U.S. administration argues that drones only target the members of 
armed groups through signature strikes.237 But the data collected by a non-
governmental organization and Pakistani sources show that the United States 
carried out 300–374 strikes between 2004 and 2012. The tally of deaths of 
innocents range from 400 to 900, with an additional 600 people seriously 
injured.238 These deaths occurred because of drone strikes targeting social 
gatherings; noncombatants who had come to the aid of survivors would be 
233 University of Geneva, “Qualification of Armed Conflicts,” Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts 
Project, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed_conflict.php; Joint Study, 
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engaged again with the second drone strike presuming them to be terrorists 
helping terrorists.  
Article 57 of the additional protocol to the Geneva Convention reflects on 
the “precautions in attack and specifies that the civilian population shall not be 
the object of attack.”239 The International Committee of the Red Cross has made 
a clean distinction between civilians who participate in unambiguous activity and 
those who keep a continuous combatant function; however, concerns about the 
strike’s safeguard remain an issue in view of back-to-back strikes with no 
confirmation whether the target is legitimate or otherwise.240   
According to Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “the CIA’s drone 
campaign in Pakistan has killed dozens of civilians who had gone to help rescue 
victims … specifically at least 50 civilians were killed in follow-up strikes when 
they had gone to help victims.”241 To this end, Christof Heyns states, “If civilians 
‘rescuers’ are indeed being intentionally targeted, there is no doubt about the 
law: those strikes are war crimes.”242 But, in the tribal environment of Pakistan, 
distinction between an innocent and a terrorist is a complicated and challenging 
issue, making it difficult for signature strikes.243 Militants seeking refuge in tribal 
areas do not wear any kind of uniform that make them discernible. Moreover, in 
tribal culture everyone carries a weapon, which makes it difficult for the drones to 
distinguish between the innocents and militants. 
239 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol additional to the Geneva Convention 
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Thus, it becomes an issue of proportionality. Drone operations are also in 
violation to Article 51 of the additional protocol requiring “the protection of civilian 
population.”244 Evidence suggests that mostly the civilian rescue workers, 
marriage ceremonies, and religious places are targeted.245 Even if the legitimate 
target is identified, the large presence of innocent civilians in such a space 
makes the strike disproportionate.246 If these civilians are intentionally targeted, 
the strikes legally constitute war crimes.  
3. The UN Perspective 
Article 2(4) prohibits use of force by a state against another. A problem 
comes up with the interpretation of two exceptions: “Consent” and “Unwillingness 
and Inability” of a state to control terrorist and unlawful activities from its land. In 
a complicated issue like drone strikes, it is very difficult to draw the definitive red 
line. Drawing inferences by disregarding the ground realities, real intentions, and 
capabilities of a state are always fraught with ambiguity.247  
In 2013, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a 
resolution on the “Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom while 
countering Terrorism,” which was against the employment of drones in foreign 
territories. The resolution clearly defines the limits on measures and means 
employed—including drones—against terrorism. Every counterterrorism act has 
to comply—international law, IHL, IHRL—and respect the principles of 
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proportionality and distinction. Lately, the European Union has also passed a 
resolution against the drone strikes.248 
D. CONCLUSION  
Many in the U.S administration are of the opinion that customary 
international law, which provides a broader right to act in self-defense—including 
against non-state actors—cannot be replaced by Article 51 of the UN Charter.249 
Upon invoking a robust self-defense doctrine, no other legal framework such as 
IHL would apply to the targeted killings; moreover, the policy permits preemptive 
self- defense even if the threat is not imminent.250  
Initially, Pakistan had an ambiguous stance on drones, and used to 
celebrate the killings of HVTs.251 But this stance changed over time due to 
internal political dynamics of the country. In 2013 the Prime Minister of Pakistan 
Nawaz Sharif discussed the drone issue with President Obama as a violation of 
“territorial integrity, and a major irritant in [mutual] relations.”252 Even in the 
presence of consent, international law should not be used to evade human 
rights.253  
Pakistan has apprehended HVTs, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad 
and Abu Zubaydah, in the past, and also continues to help the United States by 
248 Iqbal, “Drones under UN Scrutiny.”  
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providing actionable intelligence.254 The thorny issue is of inability, where the 
argument of a weak state comes up. In the article “Adapting American’s Security 
Paradigm and Security Agenda,” the author writes, “Some states are weak 
because they cannot control parts of their territories.”255 Though it is true that 
Pakistan still faces problems in its tribal areas, some 150,000 troops have been 
deployed to control the situation.256 Nonetheless, the inability of a state raises 
serious questions about the irregular forces—non-state actors—using its territory 
against another state. Theresa Reinold states that “the criteria for engaging non-
state actors on foreign soil must reconcile the victim state’s vital security interests 
with the harboring state’s sovereignty.”257  Moreover, she further argues that “the 
notion that sovereignty implies responsibility for effective territorial control has 
been used to support a more expansive interpretation of the right to self-defense 
in response to irregular warfare.”258 
The United States has refused accountability and transparency on its 
policies of targeted killings, which is in violation of the international legal 
framework.259 In his famous “cross roads” speech, President Obama defined a 
time-bound policy for finishing the weapon-related employment of drones, and, 
thereafter would restrict drone usage to surveillance.260 Given the divergent 
national security interests of both countries, it seems unlikely that the United 
States would re-evaluate its drone policies. 
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IV. DRONE OPERATIONS: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Although both the United States and Pakistan are fighting the GWOT to 
achieve their respective national security objectives, the benefits of drone strikes 
by and large are reaped by the United States, whereas the costs are more 
evident in Pakistan.261 To focus only on drone effectiveness in terms of killing 
more terrorists or civilians “lacks strategic framing and context.”262 The U.S. 
drone operations—and targeted killing policy—should focus on the effectiveness 
to promote stability, de-escalate conflicts, and stop the growth and influence of 
terrorist organizations.263 This framework will afford comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis. However, the complicated protocols and secrecy involved in the use of 
drones has affected U.S. Congressional oversight of drone deployment to carry 
out an objective appraisal in military, political, technological, and economic 
spheres.264  
A successful drone policy should be effective, transparent, and well 
controlled. Even the Obama White House agrees, noting in the 2010 Presidential 
Policy Guidelines (PPG): “We will uphold our laws and values and will share as 
much information as possible with the American people and the Congress, 
consistent with our national security needs and the proper functioning of the 
Executive Branch.”265 The PPG, which provides control and clear rules of 
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engagement for drones, mark a tentative first step towards applying these criteria 
to U.S. drone strikes.266 In the meantime, drone strikes have considerably 
decreased after 2010, amid domestic and international criticism, much of which 
demands a new accounting.  
A. WHY DRONES ARE PREFERRED IN MODERN WARFARE  
It is pertinent to mention briefly something about the preference for using 
drones over fighter aircraft in the recent history of warfare. Drones are the 
combined production of United States Air Force (USAF) and CIA that has 
distinctive features. First, the drone is unmanned but controlled by a pilot sitting 
far away from the combat zone, reducing the mental and physical stress of the 
battlefield. The crew can be rotated during the operation. Second, drones can 
support flights of long duration and can carry out surveillance of targets for 
approximately 24 hours. This affords a chance for the crew to obtain detailed 
reconnaissance of the target area to reduce collateral damage once it strikes. 
Third, drones have strong cameras installed in them that can identify the target 
from well above 15,000 feet. A computer system can store the collected data, 
and can give complete details of the suspect’s movement spread over a number 
of days and in some cases even months. This enables the pilots to get familiar 
with their targets. In brief, the drones are less expensive, more accurate, and 
more useful than manned aircraft as drones can fly slowly and low due to their 
unmanned nature.267   
Two overriding factors make the drone a better option than aircraft and 
precision guided munitions. First, drone operations are risk-free missions; the 
U.S. military personnel are safe from any kind of battlefield harm and its 
266 Ibid. 
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associated psychological effects. Second, a drone can collect detailed data about 
the target and at the same time can engage the target with precision.268 
In carrying out a comparison of collateral damage between regular air 
warfare and drone strikes, William Saletan states that  
In Vietnam, aerial bombing killed more than 50,000 North 
Vietnamese civilians by 1969. Each year of that war, the least 
discriminate weapons—bombs, shells, mines, mortars—caused 
more civilian injuries than guns and grenades. In Kosovo, the 
munitions were more precise, and NATO tried to be careful. But 
according to a postwar report by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, NATO’s insistence on flying its planes no 
lower than 15,000 feet—a rule adopted ‘to minimize the risk of 
casualties to itself—may have meant the target could not be 
verified with the naked eye.269  
It proves the point that pilot’s safety took precedence over the collateral 
damage resulting in the killings of large number of civilians. In recent past, 
Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah and Hamas, the Russian-Chechen War of 1999, 
and the issue of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka killed more 
civilians than the fighters.270 In Afghanistan, the manned aircraft have inflicted 
more civilian casualties than drone strikes during 2011‒2013; consequently 
drone strikes increased due to the low ratio of civilian casualties.271 
Drones, however, have few weaknesses. Command of complete airspace 
is vital for drone operation because these aerial platforms are susceptible to 
jamming, and relatively easier to shoot down because of their slow speed and 
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noise. Countries where drones are used should meet two criteria: tacit approval 
of their governments; USAF complete command of the sky over the battle zone 
to guard against interference by anyone.272 
1. Benefits: Drone Operations in the GWOT  
Militarily, drones have proven to be an effective tool in counterinsurgency 
operations. In Pakistan, from 2004 until July 2014, drone strikes that varied in 
number between 376 and 393 killed up to 3,490 personnel.273 The strength of 
the terrorists killed from different tiers of the organization varied between 1,670 
and 2,849; civilian casualties varied between 258 and 307, and the remaining 
casualties were unknown.274 Nek Mohammad, Baitullah Mehsud, and 
Hakimullah Mehsud who succeeded each other as head of the Taliban chapter in 
Pakistan were amongst the terrorists who were killed by drones since 2006.275  
Drones are a means to achieve U.S. goals in the GWOT by “ensuring that 
al-Qaeda can never again use Afghanistan to launch attacks against 
America.”276 Drones reduce the collateral damage and neutralize terrorists in 
treacherous terrain along the Pak-Afghan border.277 It is widely believed that 
killing top terrorists helps dismantle the terrorist sanctuaries.278 In Pakistan, 
mostly, drones have carried out targeted killings—signature and personality 
strikes—by killing “at least 94 top leaders and operatives of al-Qaeda and 
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affiliated groups in Pakistan.”279 Leon Panetta, former CIA director, once deemed 
drones as the “most important weapons in the fight against terrorism.”280 
Economically, the cost incurred by drone operations proves quite lower as 
compared to that for strike fighters. The MQ Reaper drone cost $9.48 million 
including the operational cost, whereas the F-35 fighter costs $91 million, 
excluding the operation expenditures. Similarly, soldiers prove even more costly 
than drones as each soldier in Afghanistan costs $2.1 million; soldiers’ survival 
would entail more expenditure on their war injuries, rehabilitations, and welfare in 
the long term. In terms of monetary cost, the drone is a preferred option for U.S. 
policy makers.281 
Technologically, the U.S. DOD argues that “UAVs [drones] amount to 
safer, cheaper, and more effective warfare in the U.S. fight against terrorism,” but 
this view completely misses the point of civilian casualties, especially in Pakistan, 
that have resulted from drone strikes.282 Up until 2014, 85 percent of casualties 
in 393 drone strikes were militants; the remaining casualties were either civilians 
or unknown.283 Drone technology conserves human efforts and precious lives. In 
FATA, apart from the logistics costs and threats during the movement of troops, 
Pakistan military fatalities crossed the 5,000 mark in 2014.284  
279 Ibid.  
280 Targeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of 
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In the absence of any credible data that could define the number of 
terrorists killed versus the soldiers martyred in a conventional battle in FATA, the 
author has a personal experience to quote from. In a sector where the author 
commanded a battalion, it took almost 10‒15 soldiers for every terrorist killed, 
which indeed is a very high ratio. Unconventional means like drones really 
helped in targeted killing of Taliban leadership that was extremely difficult to 
achieve through conventional means in more restive agencies of FATA, such as 
North and South Waziristan.      
Politically, the drone strikes helped Pakistan’s weak political government 
to challenge the terrorists and to show a brave face to the public. As Christine 
Fair states drones have overcome the administration’s “inability to provide for the 
security and prosperity of its own [Pakistan] people.”285 After joining the GWOT, 
the terrorists attacked—at will—Pakistan’s military and civilian targets with 
impunity; law enforcement agencies (LEAs) were unable to counter the terrorist 
threat due to lack of capacity, capability, and a weak legal system.286 The 
insecurity created problems for the political leadership as well as for the 
investment community.  
U.S. drone operations in Pakistan have contributed directly and indirectly 
to restoring public confidence in political institutions and LEAs by targeting many 
high profile terrorists (i.e., killing successive Taliban top leadership from 2004 to 
2013). Any kind of lull or decrease in the drone strikes has helped terrorists to re-
group by striking ruthlessly against all kinds of targets; the strikes dropped from 
122 in 2010 to 26 in 2014.287  
285 C. Christine Fair, “Addressing Pakistan’s Sovereign Deficit,” German Marshall Fund of 
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B. COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR PAKISTAN 
In Pakistan, drone operation is a complicated issue for a variety of 
reasons. First, the population does not measure drone strikes in terms of 
effectiveness, but by civilian casualties and sovereignty violations. Thus, these 
operations are not fully endorsed by the public.288 Second, intelligence and 
military authorities are not on board to verify the targets—”pre-authorized 
targets”289—and to discuss the time of strike. Third, it is not clear how a terrorist 
can be targeted if he is hiding behind a human shield. Providing shelter to a HVT 
or any terrorist is neither lawful nor justified; however, the definition and 
interpretation of a terrorist is a complex issue. According to the tribal code 
anyone who seeks protection or Nanawatai, which means asylum, should be 
offered protection at all costs, which makes the entire process of targeted killing 
very complicated.290 These issues have created serious dilemmas for Pakistan. 
1. Pakistan’s Dilemma 
The terrorist organizations equated the Pakistan military with the U.S. 
forces—against whom jihad is justified—when Pakistan aligned itself with the 
entire world in the U.S.-led GWOT. The dangerous ideological perception helped 
terrorists win the sympathies of locals, who in turn facilitated the terrorists—
suicide volunteers—against the state and armed forces of Pakistan. The 
terrorist–tribal nexus believed that Pakistan was fighting American’s war. To this 
end, Hina Rabbani Khar, a former Pakistan foreign minister stated, “This has to 
be our war. We are the one who has to fight against them. As the drone flies over 
the territory of Pakistan, it becomes an American war again. And this whole logic 
288 Telegraph Staff, “Pakistan ‘Secretly Endorsed Drone Strikes,” Telegraph, October 24, 
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10401109/Pakistan-secretly-
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of this being our fight, in our own interest is immediately put aside and again it is 
war which is imposed on us.”291 
In counterinsurgency operations, the direct approach focuses primarily on 
the use of military force while the indirect approach focuses more on winning the 
hearts and minds of the population, which keeps them away from the insurgents. 
Increasing the gulf between the insurgents and population is an essential 
element in restoring peace and order in the affected areas. However, drone 
strikes cast a negative impact on the population. The killing of the innocent by 
drone strikes due to incorrect intelligence enabled insurgents to exploit the 
victims’ grief and legitimize the terrorists’ cause. The insurgents justify their 
violence as a reaction to drone strikes; ironically, it is not the terrorists only who 
react to drones, but “they are even loathed by them [common man] who despise 
the extremists.”292  
On the political front, on the one hand, the Pakistani government 
celebrates the killing of terrorists by drone strikes, and claims that the wanted 
terrorists are on the run, whereas the government faces huge anti-drone 
protests, which suggests that the leadership struggles with legitimacy. In fact, 
drone operations have corroded the legitimacy and stability of local governments 
of Pervez Musharraf, and successive political governments of President Asif Ali 
Zardari and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.293  
2. Root Cause of Extremism 
For the United States, drones are an effective counterterrorism tool in 
modern warfare and force multipliers to the ground operations. Moreover, they 
291 Shehzad, Inside Al-Qaeda and Taliban, 82–83; Boyle, “The Cost and Consequences of 
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have reduced the civilian casualties in counterinsurgency operations.294 For 
Pakistan, the main issue relates to the killing of innocent civilians; the number of 
casualties hardly makes any difference. Drone strikes that kill innocent civilians 
result in recruitment of impressionable angry youth, which unfortunately brings 
the terrorists and civilians closer together.295 Terrorists exploit the public anger 
against drones, notwithstanding the politicizing of the issue by politicians for 
personal gain and mileage. This exploitation by the terrorists empowers them, 
which provides them the space to move and survive.296   
The Pakistani Taliban exploits the collateral damage issue and recruits 
hundreds of volunteers for suicide bombing and other terrorist activities in 
Pakistan.297 The tactical effects of drone strikes have unintended consequences; 
terrorists instead of decreasing have increased manifold. As Gregory Johnson, a 
scholar at Princeton University once said, “U.S. strikes and particularly those that 
kill civilians be they men or women are sowing the seeds of a future generation 
of terrorists.”298 Similarly, Michael Morrell, a former deputy director of the CIA 
has stated that the drone program is counterproductive if it kills other than the 
terrorists who threaten U.S. security interests and plan terror attacks on its 
mainland.299  
The tribal sentiment of “badal means revenge” is exploited by the terrorists 
in recruiting any distressed party whose relatives have died in drone strikes. The 
rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan is more or less proportional to the drone 
294 Lewis, “Drones.” 
295Johnson and Sarbahi, “The Impact of Drones Strikes,” 4–5.   
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strikes in any specified period. For instance, in 2010, 117 drone strikes were 
carried out in Pakistan; consequently, the terrorists also unleashed suicide 
bombers in every corner of the country, killing almost 300 innocent civilians, 
including three Americans. Fatalities through planned attacks, improvised 
explosives, and targeted killings are not included.300 
3. Problems for the Elected Government 
Drone operations create legitimacy problems for the elected government, 
which has serious political repercussions. Unabated drone strikes suggest 
strongly to the public that the country cannot defend its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.301 This policy is in contradiction to the U.S. long-term strategy and 
interests in “increasing the legitimacy and capacity of the government in 
Islamabad.”302 In simple words, the short-term gains from killing wanted terrorists 
through drone strikes result in strategic consequences by compounding the trust 
deficit between two historic allies. This, in turn, affects the U.S. policy—peace 
and stability—in nuclear Pakistan.303 To this end, the U.S. ambassador to 
Pakistan, Cameron Munter, appealed to Leon Panetta, then CIA chief, to disallow 
the drone strikes, but to no avail.304 It is true that on the one hand drone strikes 
have benefited Pakistan by killing the wanted terrorists, who have killed a 
number of civilians and military personnel, but, on the other hand, absence of 
political or military endorsement creates severe problems for the government.305  
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In the current circumstances, the government cannot provide anti-Taliban 
and pro-American narrative in the wake of drone operations. The Taliban after 
every suicide and armed attack in Pakistan claims it is in retaliation for drone 
strikes that killed innocent civilians. The claim does appeal to the public in a way 
that they stand divided and perplexed. Although politicians have gained political 
mileage from the drone issue, at the same time successive governments have 
registered their reservations over this issue. President Asif Ali Zardari 
(2008‒2013) has stated, “We feel strikes are an invasion on our sovereignty, 
which is not appreciated by most of our people, as the first aspect of war is to win 
hearts and minds.” Similarly, the sitting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is more 
critical than his predecessors and has highlighted the issue a number of times.306 
The social view on the drone strikes adds another perspective to the 
issue. Public opinion and all kinds of media reports reflect opposition to drone 
strikes inside Pakistan. In their assessment, the GWOT fought for over almost a 
decade has not achieved significant success in Pakistan; instead, it has felled 
radicalism in youths and polarization in the society. There is an imbalance 
between the use of force and winning public support to fight against the terrorist 
elements. This imbalance has led to the rise in anti-Americanism and support for 
the terrorist organization affecting the relationship.307  
4. Spread of Violence from FATA to Main Cities of Pakistan 
In Pakistan, the drone strikes have killed many HVTs and al-Qaeda 
operatives, resulting in the degradation of militant organizations and leadership 
decapitation.308 This tactic puts restrictions on the free movement of the terrorists 
in ungoverned areas of Pakistan-FATA. In response, the terrorists moved to rural 
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and urban areas for protection and to generate violent activities.309 The spread of 
violence in settled areas of Pakistan put an extra strain on its resources by 
creating new security challenges for the government. Osama bin Laden is a case 
in point; he was found and killed in Abbottabad, a garrison city of Pakistan, in 
2011.310    
5. Social Effects  
Drone strikes have serious effects on the social fabric of the tribal society. 
They generate suspicion and fear in phenomenal ways. The locals of FATA have 
become psychological patients due to the excessive fear of becoming a drone’s 
victim. They refuse to help the wounded and collect the remains of dead for 
burial after a drone strike. An atmosphere of mistrust prevails as everyone is 
suspicious of others for providing information to the enemy—the United States—
and for placing a chip at their houses or vehicles in order to facilitate the drone 
strike. Due to their excessive uncertainty and fear of becoming an accidental 
target, people avoid going to schools, hospitals, and public places. The tribal 
culture of trust, joint family system, and social ties has been eroded by the 
disruption of the daily life activities.311     
The drone strikes have affected the willingness of locals to help the 
victims with medical assistance and rescue work. They fear the follow-up strikes 
will kill them as well. The double drone strike has legal and moral issues. It not 
only deters the locals from helping the victims, but it also deters humanitarian 
groups from providing medical coverage. The double drone strikes could lead to 
war crimes.312  
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Multiple issues related to drone strikes have made a profound impact on 
the society of tribal areas. By killing the breadwinner of a family and causing 
property damage, drone strikes have had a severe economic implication. 
Education, which is already a weak link in tribal areas of Pakistan, has been the 
main casualty in drone strikes. The old custom of attending a funeral in masses, 
celebrating a marriage in great numbers, and attending a Jirga—the gathering of 
notables to resolve issues—has been curtailed extensively.313 
C. U.S. RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN’S CONCERNS 
1. Drone: Cure not Cause of Extremism 
Andrew Cullam states that drones have the capability to “find, fix and 
finish” the expected targets in counterinsurgency operations, keeping collateral 
damage to the minimum.314 The U.S. administration maintains the same line of 
argument on the advantages and gains of drone strikes: killing HVTs, 
degradation of militant organizations, reducing collateral damage, and realizing 
benefits of drone operations in relation to ground operations.315 Drones have 
killed many HVTs, operational leaders, in Pakistan, which is the primary objective 
of these covert operations.316 An argument is that removing the top militant 
leaders from the battle zone or elsewhere in Pakistan will result in disruption of 
activities and degradation of the TTP and al-Qaeda organizations. Moreover, it 
reduces the terrorists’ ability to strike with the same lethality.317  
The repercussions of drone strikes are reflected in two forms. After killing 
the top militant leader, a blowback effect is likely to continue for a brief period, 
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but will die down because of inexperienced and less charismatic replacement 
leadership, and terrorists are likely to shift their bases to safe and settled areas 
for hiding in civil societies creating further challenges.318 Brian C. Price argues 
that  
decapitation is an effective counterterrorism strategy; terrorist 
groups are susceptible to decapitation because they have unique 
organizational characteristics (they are violent, clandestine, and 
values-based organizations) that amplify the importance of leaders 
and make leadership succession difficult.319   
2. Better Option than Ground Forces 
Another compelling argument in favor of drones assumes the advantages 
in relation to deployment of ground forces. Many allied and Pakistani troops 
would have been victims of the terrorist attack in the GWOT if the HVTs had not 
been killed in the strikes; which disrupted the militant activities. Pakistan lay 
outside the theatre of war, and ground attack by the United States in FATA—
Pakistan’s sovereign territory—has implications. The alternative choices range 
from covert operations to capacity building or putting diplomatic pressure on 
Pakistan. Everything has been done, but not to the utmost satisfaction of the 
United States. Eventually, drones were and are the only option to go against the 
terrorists in ungoverned areas of Pakistan.320 
In regards to collateral damage, many experts argue that drones may not 
be very effective, but they are morally required because the strikes result in fewer 
casualties than air or ground operations. The data has already been highlighted 
earlier in comparison with air warfare in past operations and wars. However, one 
of the CIA senior officials has asserted that, “drones are morally superior, even 
318 Ibid., 8.  
319 Brian C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,” MIT Press Journal of International Security 4, no. 36 (2012): 43, 
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humane, form of warfare,” neglecting the related effects of drone strikes in terms 
of alienation and desire for revenge amongst victims.321  
Finally, the United States, in the initial stages of the drone operation inside 
Pakistan, shared information with Pakistan intelligence and military authorities 
about the suspected targets; leaked documents have revealed the complicity of 
Pakistan as stated in The Washington Post: 
‘Top-secret CIA documents and Pakistani diplomatic memos’ it has 
obtained show that ‘top officials in Pakistan’s government have for 
years secretly endorsed the program and routinely received 
classified briefings on strikes and casualty counts.’322 
Over time, the sharing of information proved costly, as it helped the 
targets in making a successful escape. The U.S. administration squarely blames 
the Pakistan intelligence agency, ISI, for the leaks to suspected targets; however, 
Pakistan denies this charge outright.323  
D. AN APPRAISAL: REFUTING U.S. CLAIMS  
The United States believes that drones kills terrorist and disrupt the 
organization, but no network has been eliminated since 9/11, instead they have 
swelled and spread over the globe. For every terrorist killed, there emerges a 
band of new, lethal, and more radicalized terrorists; consequently, al-Qaeda has 
morphed into new movements since 9/11.324 Similarly, Jenna Jordan’s study 
reveals that decapitation is a misguided strategy and states that, “decapitation is 
more likely to have counterproductive effects in larger, older, religious, and 
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separatist organizations. In these cases decapitation not only has a much lower 
rate of success, the marginal value is, in fact, negative.”325 
Economically, drones are cheap, but have they have wrought a 
tremendous amount of damage by destroying vehicles, health units, and 
madrassas, religious schools.326 Even the domestic buildings, commonly known 
as compounds, are not spared. Approximately 132 buildings have been 
destroyed in about 390 drone strikes.327 The existing infrastructure of FATA has 
been turned into ruins. Besides human loss, the strikes result in high economic 
loss. 
With the latest camera technology and extended surveillance capability, 
drones are considered to be safe weapons in regard to collateral damage, but 
hundreds of civilians—400 to 900, including 200 children—have been killed, 
many of them in the process of celebrating marriages, funerals, or other basic 
human occasions.328 In fact, the definition of non-combatant varies, which makes 
the civilian casualty data highly controversial. The data of civilian casualties 
varies from 3 percent to 74 percent of the entire death toll.329 Moreover, drone 
technology has helped in recruiting more pilots at a faster rate, making this 
recruitment more cost effective than that for fighter jet pilots, who might have 
shown their inability or unwillingness to undertake targeted killings.330 
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E. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND RAMIFICATIONS 
Historically, covert operations have not served the long-term interests of 
the United States and its NSS. During the Vietnam War in the 1960s, organizing 
Air America to target the communist guerilla fighters in the north was a case in 
point. However, it is said that for great powers, “Foreign policy is not a game of 
risk. Great nations achieve lasting influence and security not by bloody gambits 
but through economic growth, scientific innovation, military deterrence, and the 
power of ideas.” This view negates the idea of targeted killings and covert 
operations.331 
In terms of strategic cost, drone operation sets a dangerous precedent for 
other countries that will trigger more wars, affecting peace and order in the world. 
Countries like China, India, and Russia, which are in the development stage of 
sophisticated armed drones, would make use of this technology against 
adversaries when required.332 To support this point Scott Shane has stated: 
If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt 
minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will 
the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft 
to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after 
militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely 
find their own example thrown back at them.333   
Apart from the legal and ethical issues, the U.S. drone policy projects a 
violent image of American foreign policy.334 The widespread perception that the 
United States acts unilaterally disregarding other countries’ sovereignty and 
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interests has kept its image low.335 By merciless killings in the name of national 
security reflects arrogance and self-righteousness by the U.S. administration.336 
It has affected the relationship with the people and governments of other 
countries such as Pakistan, which has no other option but to assent.337 The 
flawed drone policy has achieved immediate success by killing key terrorist 
elements in Pakistan’s territory; however, it has led to social and political 
blowback in the form of anti Americanism.338 The U.S. drone policy coupled with 
a monopoly on drones at present has given the United States a short-term 
advantage, but drones are cheap asymmetric weapons, which will spread to 
other countries and non-state actors.339 The legitimizing of drone warfare for 
others in the long run will change the short-term advantage into a long-term 
disadvantage for the United States.340 
F. ANALYSIS 
Steve Coll identified that the technological leap has transformed the 
assassins from humans to machines and drones have taken the lead.341 The 
negative impact of the U.S. drone strategy in Pakistan has resulted in increased 
anti-American sentiment coupled with backlash from the militants; media has 
played a major role in transforming public opinion. To this end, General 
335 PEW Research Staff, “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted: 
Drone Strikes Widely Opposed,” PEW Research, June 13, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/
06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/.   
336  David P. Gushee, “The Moral Hazards of U.S. Drone Policy,” Faithstreet Blog,  February 
3, 2013, http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2013/02/07/the-moral-hazards-of-us-drone-policy/
15419. 
337 Ibid.  
338 Joshua Foust and Ashley S. Boyle, “The Strategic Context of Lethal Drones: A 
Framework for Discussion,” Scribd, August 16 , 2012, https://www.scribd.com/doc/102744195/
The-Strategic-Context-of-Lethal-Drones.  
339 Conor Friedersdorf, “Lethal Drones: Coming Soon to Every Country that Wants Them: 
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McChrystal has said that, “drone strikes create a perception of American 
arrogance that says well we can fly where we want, we can shoot where we 
want, because we can;”342 however, the drone strikes continue. 
For the present, U.S.-Pakistan relations are far from a breaking point, but 
they have deteriorated alarmingly. Drone operations have affected the political 
legitimacy of the government by suggesting that it is not the Pakistan government 
“who controls [Pakistan] and who exactly can protect them [the public] from 
domestic and external threats.”343 This may not auger well for the transitional 
democracy in the country, which ultimately will affect the overall relationship with 
the United States. As Stephen Tankel has warned that, “a further deterioration in 
relations could seriously compromise counterterrorism and nonproliferation 
interests, not to mention the regional diplomatic initiatives, especially in 
Afghanistan.”344 
The arguments for drone operations by the United States in military, 
economic, technological, political, and strategic spheres may afford short-term 
benefits, but for the world in general and Pakistan, in particular, these operations 
have dangerous consequences. It is said that continued drone operation in 
Pakistan “essentially amounts to state-sanctioned execution without clear rules,” 
suggesting that drone strikes affect stability. They can result in an increase in 
terrorist activities and erode the legitimacy of the political leadership, as well as 
fuel the anti-Americanism sentiment in Pakistan.345 In other words, the United 
States loses, too, over the long term. 
342 Haider, “Murder by Drones”; William C. Harrop, “Remarks by the President at the 
National Defense University,” (Speech at National Defense University, July 18, 2013) 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2013/0608/sw/sp07_harrop.html.  
343 Fair, “Addressing Pakistan’s Sovereign Deficit.”  
344 Stephen Tankel, “A Pakistan-Based Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Homeland,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, August 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
CPA_contingencymemo_13.pdf.  
345 Gregor Peter Schmitz, “The Debate on Push-Button War: Are Drones Worth their 
Drawbacks?” Spiegel International, March 12, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-
debate-on-push-button-war-are-drones-worth-their-drawbacks-a-682645.html.  
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Drone operations have resulted in a desensitization of strategic thinkers to 
warfare because of their cost effectiveness and the U.S. legal precedents. 
Whether drones have helped in achieving the national security objectives of the 
United States or not, they have not terminated any conflict in the GWOT around 
the globe. As Susan Brooks has pointed out, “[Drones] will not reduce conflicts. 
Their very ease of use will tempt—our very own included—engaging in 
automated conflicts.”346 P.W. Stinger in his book Wired for Wars revealed that at 
least 43 nations are developing drone technology, including the United Kingdom, 
Israel, and Pakistan, with Chinese assistance.347 Ultimately, in future, the United 
States might face a terrorist group with the same technology. In the same book, 
Stinger quotes Steven Metz’s prediction: “We will see if not identical 
technologies, then parallel technologies being developed particularly because of 
the off-the-shelf nature of this all … the bad guys do not need to develop it; 
instead they can just buy it.” This observation clearly suggests that international 
peace and order is likely to be affected.348 
The drone operations have claimed counterterrorism victories; however, 
they have also received criticism from international community on political, legal, 
and moral grounds.349 The established precedent of U.S. drone operation by 
disregarding international norms is likely to pose a long-term security dilemma for 
the United States.350 In GWOT, despite the short-term benefits of drone 
operations, the way these strikes are perceived by other countries has negative 
346 Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, “Drone Wars: The Temptation of Automated Conflicts,” 
Washington Post, December 5, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blog/guest-voices/post/
drone-wars-the-temptation-of-automatedconflicts/2011/12/05/
gIQA1rilWO_blog.html?wprss=guess-voices. 
347 P. W. Stinger, Wired For Wars: The Robotic Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century 
(New York: Penguin Group, 2009) 241–50; Laura Lynch, “Pakistan Building its Own Drone,” PRI’s 
The World, April 13, 2012, http://www.pri.org/stories/2012-04-13/pakistan-building-its-own-
drones.  
348 Ibid.  
349 Jonathan Masters, “Targeted Killings,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
350 Sara Birkenthal, “ U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: A Strategic Analysis,” Claremont Mc 
Kenna College, 2011–2012, 2, https://www.claremontmckenna.edu/keck/student/
Birkenthal%20Fellowship%20Paper.pdf.  
 80 
                                            
consequences for the United States in the long run.351 Anti-Americanism, local 
and regional instability, eroded legitimacy for the Pakistani elected governments, 
and ever increasing terrorist recruitment rates are a few of the consequences.352  
To conclude, asymmetric advantages over adversaries always decide the 
outcome of wars, as it is said that “winning is about unfair advantage at four 
levels—political, strategic, theatre, and tactical—of any conflict.”353 The United 
States exploits all these four essential aspects of victory. Being an influential 
super power of the world, the United States conveniently controls the political 
fallout of drone operations at every forum. Moreover, drones provide a unique 
asymmetric advantage at the strategic, operational, and tactical level in 
Afghanistan, which prevents the Taliban from attacking in strength, carrying out 
counter attacks, or holding an important location.354 
The weapon may have achieved tactical and strategic gains for the United 
States in the GWOT; however, in drone operations, the complicity of Pakistan, 
effectiveness of drones in counterterrorism operations, their tactical and strategic 
gains have to be measured against the human values and loss of innocent 
human lives. 
351 Ibid., 18. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ejaz Haider, “Drones: Choosing Between Droning on and Understanding,” Dawn News, 
August 2014, printed in a detailed report on, “Unfair advantage of death and drones,” 
http://www.dawn.com/in-depth/unfair-advantage-of-death-and-drones/.  
354 Montgomery C. Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters: 
U.S. Army War College 33, no 2 (2003): 7, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
U.S. drone strikes have achieved tactical militarily success by killing 
HVTs, but they have also killed many innocent civilians as collateral damage 
while violating the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan. Consequently, it helped 
recruitment in terrorist organizations, increased anti-American sentiments, and 
cast a pall on U.S.-Pakistan relations. Moreover, the drone strategy, which 
mostly is in violation of international law and the ethics of warfare, has invited 
condemnation from all over the world.355  
The United States has the oldest democracy in the world, and has 
famously supported the consideration of ethics and morals in international 
politics. These universal values are widely shared by freedom loving countries of 
the world. It is expected that the United States should not trade off ethical and 
moral values for national security interests; instead, these values should find a 
significant place in U.S. foreign policy and actions abroad. A battle between 
moral and practical concerns often creates a dilemma for states, but in the end, a 
balance has to be stuck.356 
A. THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF DRONE STRIKES 
Moral and ethical arguments provide a new dimension to the drone issue. 
Drones keep the U.S. troops safer at the cost of increasing the risk to non-
combatants.357 The loss of innocent lives through drones, and the indifferent 
U.S. reaction—no inquiry, no condolences, and no compensation to the 
355 Abdul-Rehman, “Impact of Drone Attack in Pakistan and the War on Terror” (Special 
Study, Department of Global Political Studies, Malmo University, October 2013), 31–34, 
http://muep.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/16281/
Drone%20attacks%20%26%20war%20on%20terror.pdf?sequence=2. 
356 Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, “The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching 
a Values Consensus,” Foreign Affairs, June 2003, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58968/
leslie-h-gelb-and-justine-a-rosenthal/the-rise-of-ethics-in-foreign-policy-reaching-a-values-
consensus.   
357 Jonathan Shine, “The Ethics of Unmanned Drones in Modern Warfare,” The Center for 
Public Justice, February 25, 2011, http://www.capitalcommentary.org/just-war/ethics-unmanned-
drones-modern-warfare. 
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aggrieved families—remains an ethical question.358 Moreover, traumatic stress, 
which the local population of FATA suffers through every day, is another ethical 
issue that remains unaddressed.359  
The moral context also overlaps with the legal issues of drone strikes. 
Signature and personality strikes are the case in point. It becomes very difficult to 
cross match the behavior pattern of a terrorist in FATA of Pakistan due to cultural 
affinity and human—drone operator—error. The terrorists do not wear uniforms, 
remain dressed up in local clothes, and mingle with innocent civilians. In such a 
situation a few analysts have blamed the innocent civilians who have “rendered 
themselves human shields of the terrorists.”360 On the contrary, the civilian 
casualties in drone strikes demonstrate that innocents were killed instead of the 
real targets. No one is held accountable for the lapse because nobody (except 
perhaps the CIA) actually knows who the main actor behind the strike is; the 
pilot, the data collector, or the one who ordered it.361  
John Brennan, counterterrorism advisor, has defended the drone 
operations as “legal, wise, and ethical.”362 Likewise, Machiavelli363 said: “Nations 
are not bound by any moral structures, and that a nation exists only to serve 
itself,” clearly sidelining the moral factors in international politics.364 The point 
further implies that power politics is coercive and results-oriented.365 In such an 
358 Medea Benjamin, “10 Ways to Reduce the Threat of Terrorist Attacks on Americans,” 
Mondoweiss, August 6, 2013, http://mondoweiss.net/2013/08/10-ways-to-reduce-the-threat-of-
terrorist-attacks-on-americans#sthash.IDyY87uc.dpuf.  
359 Shine, “The Ethics of Unmanned Drones.” 
360 Strawser, Killing by Remote Control, 65. 
361 Professor David Luban, “Drones: the Law and Ethics of Drone Strikes,,” September 8, 
2013, http://podacademy.org/podcasts/drones-the-law-and-ethics-of-drone-strikes/.   
362 Charlie Savage, “Top U.S. Security Official Says ‘Rigorous Standards’ Are Used for 
Drone Strikes,” New York Times, April 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/
obamas-counterterrorism-aide-defends-drone-strikes.html.  
363 Machiavelli was an Italian Philosopher and historian in 16th Century. 
364 Mohammad Ashraf Chaudhry, “History: Its Lessons & the Price for their Disregard – 2,” 
Pakistan Link, September 2012, http://pakistanlink.org/Opinion/2012/Sep12/28/06.HTM. 
365 Ibid. 
 84 
                                            
amoral context, drone strikes in sovereign third countries have a certain cold 
logic. However, to justify the use of drones through the legal lens would leave an 
unresolved issue; human values in the sense of moral priorities merits 
consideration.  
The ethics of drone strikes are articulated by two broad groups: those who 
support drone deployment as ethically essential, and those who deem it ethically 
destructive. Matthew Hallgarth, a former U.S. Air Force official who is one of the 
proponents of drone operations, states that humans kill humans; guns do not kill 
humans. He further states that there is no difference between a knife and a 
drone.366 Similarly, Asa Kasher, a former Israeli defense force official, argues 
that those who object to drone operation reflect a, “disrespect for the human life 
and dignity of people in military uniform.”367 By contrast, David Whetham, an 
opponent to drone strikes, states that the ethical and moral dimensions have to 
be considered in all forms of warfare—jus ad bellum and jus in bello—as without 
ethics, “war is nothing more than the application of brute force, logically 
indistinguishable from mass murder.”368   
Bradley J. Strawser is one of the main proponents of drone operations and 
justifies drone deployment in the GWOT. He argues that in pursuance of justified 
goals, it is required to protect the soldiers from an undue risk on the battlefield, 
so the use of drones is ethically correct. First, he takes on the failure of drones to 
differentiate between combatants and non-combatants, which is a technical 
weakness of the weapon. He puts out certain data that reveals that the drones 
are far more accurate—17:1 civilian targets to military death—in determining the 
combatants from non-combatants as compared to other conventional weapons—
366 Strawser, Killing by Remote Control, 61.  
367 Ibid., 65.  
368 David Whetham, Ethics, Law, and Military Operations (London: Palgrave McMillan, 
2010), 11–15. 
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4:1—and operations of the Pakistan Army. The drone technology relies on “fire 
and observe” rather than on “fire and forget.”369 
The second issue relates to the targeted killings in a non-combat zone 
through an unmanned aerial platform, which some consider to be cowardly. 
Strawser justifies it by equating drones with high-range artillery shells fired 
across a border violating the sovereignty of a state or a missile fired from F-15 
fighter aircraft. The moral question is “who that missile is going to hit, and why—
not the platform from which it was delivered.” The hostile response was also 
visible in the past when the atomic bombs were dropped from B-52s. The hostility 
is not toward the platform, but the legality of attack and legitimacy of target.370 
The third issue relates to the asymmetry in combat, making the drone an 
unfair instrument that should not be deployed morally. Strawser rejects the notion 
of equality in combat by quoting Jeff McMahan: 
The warrior fighting for just cause is morally justified to take the life 
of the enemy combatant, whereas the unjust fighter is not justified, 
even if they follow the traditional principles of jus in bello such as 
only targeting combatants and the like, to kill the justified fighter.371 
Finally, he brushes aside the idea of war as a frequent activity by lowering 
its threshold through unmanned platforms. He terms this kind of warfare as the 
safest, which is free of all risks facilitating the just warrior. He further states that, 
“if using UAV does not incur a significant loss of capability … there is an ethical 
obligation to use them.”372  
369 Bradley J. Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhibited Aerial Vehicle,” 
Journal of Military Ethics 9, no.4 (December 2010), 342–68, http://www3.nd.edu/~dimmerma/
teaching/20402-03/locked%20PDFs/Strawser10_MoralPredators.pdf.  
370 Strawser, Killing by Remote Control, xviii; Strawser, “Moral Predators,” 356. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Strawser, “Moral Predators,” 361. 
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B. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES 
Drones pose moral problems for the United States beyond Strawser’s 
reading of the battle ethics. The problem relates to the excessive loss of innocent 
civilians lives, violations of jus in bello, the failure to provide a chance to the 
victims to surrender, and finally the uneven asymmetry in the GWOT between 
the United States and terrorists, which is unfair. Besides the blowback effect of 
drone strikes that does more harm to U.S. security, drone strikes set a wrong 
precedent for the future.373   
1. Accountability and Transparency: Democratic Norms 
The U.S. official data on civilian casualties does not match with the ground 
realties. The variation in civilian casualty data increased during President 
Obama’s Administration with the increase in drone strikes. Two factors explain 
the variation in casualty data: to prevent democratic accountability and 
independent inquiry.374 
Democratic accountability is undermined because drone strikes afford a 
better option to safeguard the lives of U.S. troops as compared to the political 
fallout due to soldier casualties. Battle casualties always become a source of 
concern and are often debated in consolidated democracies. In 1993, in Somalia, 
the famous Black Hawk Down incident, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 
their bodies desecrated, put the sitting government under a lot of pressure.375 In 
ten years of fighting the GWOT, the United States forces have suffered almost 
2,343 fatal casualties, which by far is less than the Vietnam War—almost 58,000 
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deaths.376 Since then, besides better planning and revolution in military affairs, 
drones have played a major role in reducing the casualties on the battlefield, 
providing a political safeguard to the sitting government.   
In regard to independent inquiry, states are bound to investigate the 
civilian casualties in wars.377 The United Nations Human Rights Council has 
called for an independent inquiry over the civilian deaths, but that has not yet 
been completed.378 The inquiry will also take into account the deliberate 
targeting of funerals and civilian gatherings in Pakistan.379 Failure to hold an 
independent inquiry by the United States resulted in the UN investigation; 
however, the investigation will get nowhere if the United States does not provide 
full support, including drone footage, to the investigating team.380 The truth 
cannot be established without the availability of drone footage. Mr. Emmerson, 
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, said that the issue of civilian deaths 
“remain[s] at the top of the UN political agenda until some consensus and 
transparency has been achieved,” but it seems quite unlikely to reach any 
conclusion on this issue as it would leads to war crimes.381 
2. Selective Application of Drone Strikes  
The scourge of terrorism has spread throughout the world. Saudi Arabia is 
one of the countries that are fighting hard to overcome terrorism. Besides huge 
376“Operation Enduring Freedom Fatalities Data,” iCasualties,” 2014, http://icasualties.org/
oef/; Michael Ip, “Looking Back: The End of the Vietnam War,” ABC News, March 29, 2013, 
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378 Ibid. 
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oil reserves, Saudi Arabia has the 13th largest economy and 25th largest (and 
accordingly well equipped) military in the world.382 If, in the future, any terrorist 
that poses imminent threat to the United States is found within the geographical 
boundaries of Saudi Arabia, would the terrorist be neutralized by drone strike or 
not? This is a difficult decision to make by the United States for its ultimate 
repercussions. The same scenario can be applied to any European country that 
has no meaningful military apparatus to handle terrorism. The United States is 
not likely to use drones in such scenarios for the sake of its long-term interests 
and international order. Deploying drones in Pakistan implies two things: first, 
Pakistan is a weak state and is not part of any strong alliance like NATO; second, 
it can shoot down drones but does not to avoid confrontation with the United 
States being dependant on it.  
3. Harboring Terrorists: Major Reason for Drone Strikes  
Lately Pakistan has launched operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan 
against the good and bad Taliban in accord with the strategic aspirations of the 
United States.383 The United States has often cited Pakistan’s unwillingness to 
neutralize the terrorists in North Waziristan to justify the drone strikes. However, 
despite the military operation across the board in North Waziristan, the drone 
strikes continue unabated. The unilateral actions of the United States to achieve 
its objectives set wrong and dangerous precedents. Drone strikes can be used 
as a force multiplier in a support role to the ground operation—Zarb-e-Azb—that 
is likely to address the concerns of Pakistani authorities. 
C. PROBLEMS RELATED TO PAKISTAN 
Drones have polarized the Pakistani society. The moral position of the 
government is not clear. On the one side, the ruling elite used to condemn the 
382 GFP Staff, “Saudi Arabia Military Strength,” GFP, Updated March 27, 2014, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=saudi-arabia;  
2014 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/saudiarabia.  
383 Judd, “U.S. Should Hand over Footage.”  
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United States for its drone operations, and on the other hand, it continues to 
allow—discreetly and unofficially—targeting of the wanted terrorists. The 
authorities can neither confront the United States nor the Pakistani public.  
1. Sovereignty Issue  
Pakistan authorities often decry violation of sovereignty when any drone 
strike takes place inside its territory. Ironically, the issue of sovereignty violation 
never came up in the case of foreign fighters—Uzbeks, and Arabs—who have 
taken refuge in FATA. The foreign fighters have been committing this violation 
since the start of the GWOT, in 2001. Pakistan authorities, politicians, media, and 
even the public never took up this matter. Therefore, raising the sovereignty 
issue against the drone operations and debarring the foreign fighter’s presence in 
FATA sends mixed signals to the international community. 
2. Collateral Damage 
In regard to collateral damage, Pakistan has launched a number of military 
operations in FATA. During these operations, the military exercised optimum 
caution while using Arty and air bombardment. However, the possibility of 
collateral damage cannot be ruled out. There are few unconfirmed reports of 
civilian deaths, these reports never made headlines. Since the military had the 
constitutional blanket and government consent, the issue of collateral damage—if 
any—will not appear on media radar. As Christine Fair stated: “In their 
[Pakistanis] universe, the loss of innocents are only worth bemoaning if an 
American drone kills them … the U.S. drone program never caused massive 
internal displacements of persons like the various Pakistani operations have.”384 
Collateral damage is part of every military operation of such intensity, but the 
absence of Pakistan’s involvement in drone operations made it a contentious 
384 C. Christine Fair, “The Pakistan Army’s Foray into North Waziristan: Get Used to 
Disappointment,” War on the Rocks,  July 7, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/the-
pakistan-armys-foray-into-north-waziristan-get-used-to-disappointment/#_.  
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issue. Involvement of Pakistan in the operational planning of drone strikes is 
likely to diminish the controversy to some extent.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Drone operations have achieved mixed results; they have killed HVTs of 
the al-Qaeda and Taliban network alongside disproportionate collateral damage 
that has caused serious problems for Pakistan. The strategy has tactical benefits, 
but it lacks strategic impact. It would be unfair to state that drone strikes in 
Pakistan are the sole reason for its sore relationship with the United States, the 
rise in terrorism in FATA, and political instability with regard to state authority; 
however, drone operations have contributed significantly to all these issues. The 
disagreement over drone strikes between the United States and Pakistan can be 
resolved through a mutually agreed upon strategy that has a long-term solution 
to terrorism, the sovereignty issue, and mutual interests. 
1. Considerations for the United States  
The United States and Pakistan should understand that mutual interests 
serve better than competing interests. Competing interests stem from varying 
beliefs, perceptions, and needs on both sides, and these issues need to be 
resolved quickly. In the GWOT, the United States drone policy should take into 
consideration its long-term interests in Pakistan. To this end, the following is 
recommended: 
1. Establish a long-term relationship with Pakistan in which the 
national interests of both countries should merge at the strategic 
level. Dealing with Pakistan on a requirement basis might solve the 
problems at hand, but it will not serve the long-term interests of 
both states.  
2. Address Pakistan’s insecurities, which can be achieved by a long-
term solution to Afghanistan’s instability and making Pakistan 
relevant in the U.S.-India strategic calculus.  
3. Find some alternative strategy to drone operations. This demands 
sincere cooperation of intelligence agencies on both sides. Through 
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joint collaboration in intelligence, covert operations could be 
launched against the terrorist networks.  
4. Make the policy—pre- and post-drone strike—on targeted killings 
transparent, and those who follow it should be made accountable in 
case of any transgression. This will set a precedent for future drone 
operations by any country, and is likely to gain legitimacy with 
regard to respecting state sovereignty.  
2. Considerations for Pakistan  
1. Acknowledge problems. It is said that recognizing the problem is 
part of the solution. The existence of non-state actors is a reality, 
which if recognized by Pakistan authorities without classifying these 
non-state actors as good and bad will definitely help towards a long 
lasting solution. A multi-prong approach of negotiations and 
development in FATA, especially in the education sector, should be 
carried out with the tribal people. This will reduce terrorist 
sympathizers by keeping them at a distance from the on-state 
actors and will win their hearts and minds. Force should be used as 
a last resort.  
2. Evolve and use the domestic legal system effectively to take on the 
terrorists instead leaving them to outside force for punitive actions. 
This will establish the rule of law, strengthen the legal system, and 
also decrease the inter-state conflicts.  
3. Clarify roles and responsibilities. The complicated relationship 
among the government, armed forces, intelligence agencies, and 
non-state actors has a profound impact on the overall strategy of 
fighting terrorism. To safeguard the national interest every organ of 
the state should play its effective, legitimate, and constitutional role 
in concert with all stakeholders. 
4. Be straightforward in partnerships and international relations. 
Pakistan should act consistently, instead of playing a double game 
with its ally. In present times, one cannot afford to “run with the 
hare and hunt with the hound” because of obvious repercussions. A 
dual policy on drone operations by protesting in public and 
complaining about sovereignty violations while celebrating the 
killings of HVTs is not an affordable option. 
5. Generate a counter-narrative and mobilize the media by openly 
declaring the Taliban as state enemies and proclaiming that we are 
fighting our own war; it is not an American war. The Americans are 
helping us in this war. This will reduce the anti-American feelings. 
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6. Address the perception that Pakistan is unwilling and unable to 
track down the terrorists, which is the fundamental cause of drone 
operations in Pakistan. This perception should be addressed 
diligently in coordination with the United States.  
3. Considerations for the International Community 
1. The mere factor of the necessity to use force in self-defense has 
been stretched too far by powerful states to legitimize their military 
actions. The UN should enforce a legal framework in line with its 
Charter and customary international law to ensure correct 
application of “necessity.”  
2. Sovereignty belongs to strong as well as weak states. In pursuance 
of national objectives, the strong state should not be allowed to 
violate the territorial sovereignty of a weak state. All states should 
enforce and conform to peaceful modes of redress instead of using 
force. A framework comprising dialogue, diplomacy, and 
compromise will help resolve the issues.  
3. Procedural safeguards must be kept in mind while carrying out 
targeted killings through drones. Even if the strikes are carried out 
with the consent of a weak state, the basis of its consent should be 
clarified publicly.385 
These recommendations are not new and in one way or another have 
been oft repeated at different times since the start of the GWOT. Unfortunately, 
not a single recommendation has been followed according to the letter or spirit. 
Consequently, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is deteriorating by the day. The 
common perception is that for now, Pakistan is becoming irrelevant in the region 
for the United States. This is a dangerous scenario, which contributes to a weak 
economy, rise in extremism, and growing insecurities regarding India, which is 
well stocked with nuclear weapons. The White House should not allow Pakistan 
to slip down the wrong path. 
385 Dawood I. Ahmed, “Defending Weak States Against the ‘Unwilling or Unable’ Doctrine of 
Self-Defense,”  Journal of International Law and International Relations (March 2013): 4–6, 
http://www.jilir.org/docs/issues/volume_9/9_2_AHMED_FINAL.pdf.  
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E. REFLECTIONS 
States normally do not pay attention to international obligations, but 
demand that the rest of the world should think and act to their satisfaction. This is 
detrimental to the collective cause of fighting terrorism. Sovereignty entails the 
discharge of certain responsibilities, which if not fulfilled due to lack of capacity, 
capability, or due to national interests can have serious repercussions. Denying 
safe havens to irregular forces and providing security to its people are the duties 
of a sovereign state. Failure to do so will initiate the right for self-defense by other 
states.386  
However, the criteria for self-defense remain uncertain with regard to two 
fundamental requirements: necessity and proportionality. The threshold for these 
two factors is interpreted differently by states and remains controversial in 
international law. This leads toward a lack of clarity in the application of self-
defense. Activating the right to self-defense by disregarding the legal framework 
will set wrong precedents for other states who either possess or are in the 
process of developing drone capability. However, “the use of force ultimately 
affects individuals and their rights and should be a concern for everyone.”387  
The tactical advantages and lethality of drones have masked the ethical 
aspect of these deadly weapons. The killings of civilians commonly referred to as 
summary execution has strategic consequences on the outcome of the GWOT; it 
is not fighting the war on terror instead feeding terrorism.388 In addition, for its 
386 Theresa Reinold, “State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense 
Post-9/11,” American Journal of International Law 105, no. 2 (April 2011): 244,  
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.2.0244?uid= 
3739560&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21105070860923.  
387 Corinne Lewis “Don’t Stop Now: The Development of the International Law, Right to Use 
Force in Self-Defense,” Journal of International Law and Policy IV, no. 3 (June 2007), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/4-1_Lewis_Corinne.pdf; Reinold, “State 
Weakness,” 284. 
388 Seamas Milne, “America’s Murderous Drone Campaign is Fuelling Terror,” Guardian, 
May 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/29/americas-drone-
campaign-terror.  
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own safety, the United States should not spread fear at other places unlawfully 
through the use of force.  
It is said that “like all other weapons platforms, drones are morally neutral; 
the policy to use them requires debate—and no policy is perfect,” provides the 
right direction towards some acceptable solution.389 Highlighting successes and 
failures of drone operations will not solve the problem; deliberate planning, good 
coordination between the stakeholders, and their deployment within the bounds 
of international law will reduce the civilian casualties to large extent making the 
drone an effective weapon against terrorism in present times.390 
389 Foust, “The Strategic Context.”  
390 Ibid. 
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